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Note
ASHCROFT v. IQBAL: HOW THE SUPREME COURT REWROTE
RULE 8 TO IMMUNIZE HIGH-LEVEL EXECUTIVE
OFFICIALS FROM POST-9/11 LIABILITY (A PLAUSIBLE
INTERPRETATION)
CARA SHEPLEY*
“Few issues in civil procedure jurisprudence are more significant
than pleading standards, which are the key that opens access to
courts.”1
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether Respondent Javaid Iqbal‘s claims against two
executive-level government supervisors asserting a qualified immunity
3
defense were sufficient to withstand dismissal. Extending a plausibility
4
standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions to all civil actions and limiting
supervisory liability in Bivens cases 5 to the government officials‘ own
purposeful constitutional violations, the Court held that Iqbal had failed to
allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that Petitioners John
Ashcroft and Ronald Mueller were personally liable for his grievances.6 In
so holding, the Court refused to evaluate the complaint as a whole, thereby
erroneously categorizing certain allegations as legal conclusions and

Copyright © 2010 by Cara Shepley.
* Cara Shepley is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland School of Law
and a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. Special thanks to Rajni K. Sekhri, Editor in
Chief; Lindsay S. Goldberg, Executive Notes and Comments Editor; Emily R. Lipps, Notes and
Comments Editor; and Kerstin M. Miller, Senior Online Articles Editor for their tremendous
effort and help throughout the publishing process. Thanks also to The Honorable Judge Benson
E. Legg, United States District Court for the District of Maryland, and to his clerks for their
support and advice and for suggesting that the best way to understand plausibility might just be to
look at an actual complaint or two.
1. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).
2. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. Id. at 1942–43.
4. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007) (holding invalid a
Section 1 Sherman Act violation complaint that included only conclusory assertions of ―parallel
conduct,‖ thereby failing to provide the Court with ―plausible grounds to infer an agreement‖).
5. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971) (recognizing an implied private cause of action for damages against federal officers
who had allegedly violated plaintiff‘s constitutional rights).
6. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51, 1953.
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exemplifying the degree to which a discretionary ―plausibility‖ standard
can lead to arbitrary dismissals based on a judge or Justice‘s individualized
understanding of that single ambiguous word. 7 In extending Twombly‘s
highly flexible plausibility standard to all civil complaints faced with
motions to dismiss—despite the fact that such an extension was
unnecessary to resolve the case—the Court engaged in an act of judicial fiat
unprecedented in the context of Rule 8. 8 Finally, the Court failed to
acknowledge its veiled reliance on the post-September 11th context when it
effectively immunized two high-level officials without considering the
merits of either qualified immunity or supervisory liability in relation to
Iqbal‘s claims. 9 Having been cited numerous times by lower courts, 10
Iqbal has had an enormous practical impact beyond its oblique
endorsements of judicial activism and non-accountability in high-level
government officials.11 If the Court had addressed the issue of qualified
immunity, it could have resolved Iqbal‘s case more transparently without
breaking with the long-standing motion to dismiss standard.12 Iqbal would
therefore never have become a controversial landmark procedural case with
implications that are—at worst—unconstitutional, and—at best—ethically
dubious.13
I. THE CASE
On November 5, 2001, during the immediate aftermath of the
September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, a Muslim Pakistani
man named Javaid Iqbal was arrested on criminal charges related to
fraudulent identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United
States.14 After his arrest, Iqbal was initially detained at the Metropolitan
Detention Center (―MDC‖) in Brooklyn, New York. 15 He was then
transferred to the MDC‘s Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit
(―ADMAX SHU‖), having been classified as a person ―‗of high interest‘‖

7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. As of May 16, 2010, Iqbal had been cited nearly 23,100 times according to Westlaw‘s
citing references.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 & n.1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d
Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
15. Id. at *1.
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to ongoing government terrorist investigation. 16 He remained at the
ADMAX SHU from January 8, 2002, until the end of July 2002.17 During
his detention, Iqbal pled guilty to the criminal charges for which he had
been arrested, and on September 17, 2002, he was sentenced to sixteen
months in prison. 18 Having been transferred back to the general prison
population from the ADMAX SHU in July, Iqbal served the remainder of
his sentence there before being removed to Pakistan on January 15, 2003.19
In May 2004, Iqbal filed a lengthy twenty-one count complaint against
the United States and numerous federal officers of various rank, asserting
constitutional and statutory violations stemming from allegedly egregious
conditions of confinement during his detention in the ADMAX SHU. 20
Iqbal claimed that thousands of Arab Muslim men were arrested and
detained in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s (―FBI‖)
post-September 11th investigations.21 Like many of these detainees, Iqbal
asserted he had been classified by the FBI as an individual ―of high
interest‖ solely because of his race, religion, and national origin, rather than
on the basis of evidence that he was involved in terrorist activities. 22
According to the complaint, then-United States Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller had approved a policy of holding
―high interest‖ detainees in ―highly restrictive conditions until they were

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *1 n.1.
19. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 149.
20. Id. at 149 & n.3 (seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). Iqbal filed his original complaint with co-plaintiff
Ehab Elmaghraby, a Muslim man from Egypt who was also arrested on criminal charges unrelated
to terrorism, deemed an individual of ―high interest,‖ and detained in the ADMAX SHU.
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 & n.1.
Elmaghraby‘s claims, however, were settled by the United States for $300,000 after the district
court ruled on the defendants‘ motion to dismiss and were never a part of the case on appeal.
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 147. Along with the United States, the complaint named a mass of individual
government-officer defendants ranging from John Ashcroft, the Attorney General of the United
States at the time of Iqbal and Elmaghraby‘s arrests, and Robert Mueller, then-Director of the
FBI, to various high-ranking FBI and Federal Bureau of Prisons employees, MDC wardens, and
low-ranking corrections officers. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1. In addition to various
claims filed under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the
Alien Tort Claims Act, Iqbal alleged numerous violations of his constitutional rights under the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments based on substantive and procedural due
process, excessive force, interference with the right to counsel, denial of medical treatment,
egregious conditions of confinement, unreasonable strip and body cavity searches, interference
with religious practice, religious discrimination, and race-based equal protection. Iqbal, 490 F.3d
at 149 n.3. At issue were allegations deriving from Iqbal‘s detention in the ADMAX SHU, but
not from his arrest or initial MDC detention. Id. at 148.
21. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 148.
22. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2.
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‗cleared‘ by the FBI.‖23 Accordingly, Federal Bureau of Prisons (―BOP‖)
officers directed MDC staff to subject such detainees to the most restrictive
conditions of confinement possible at the ADMAX facility and to develop
―procedures‖ for handling them. 24 Iqbal claimed that these procedures,
which included nearly constant confinement to a prison cell, no-contact
social and legal visits, video monitoring, and communications blackouts,
were implemented without individual review of any kind and continued
until the FBI specifically approved a detainee‘s release from the ADMAX
SHU.25
Along with the other defendants, Ashcroft and Mueller moved to
dismiss Iqbal‘s complaint on a number of grounds, including qualified
immunity. 26 Judge Gleeson of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York relied on a standard under which motions to
dismiss could only be granted ―if ‗it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.‘‖27 Judge Gleeson also explained that, on one hand, in addition to
overcoming this general standard, government officials asserting a qualified
immunity defense will only prevail on pre-discovery motions to dismiss
when the plaintiff has alleged facts indicating that the official either did not
violate a ―clearly established‖ statutory or constitutional right, or, from an
objectively reasonable perspective, did not believe that he had done so.28
On the other hand, however, because government officials may not be held
liable in a Bivens action under a theory of respondeat superior, a plaintiff
must plead and prove the official‘s personal involvement in the alleged
violations to withstand a motion to dismiss.29 Judge Gleeson clarified that

23. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 148.
24. Id.
25. Id. Regarding his personal experience as an ADMAX SHU detainee, Iqbal specifically
alleged that he was: kept in solitary confinement where he was often forced to endure nearly
twenty-four-hour stretches with his cell lights on; punitively subjected to harsh weather conditions
when he was let outdoors in handcuffs and shackles; so deprived of adequate food that he lost
forty pounds; verbally abused; twice brutally beaten by MDC guards and otherwise physically
abused on a regular basis; denied medical care; subjected to daily strip and body-cavity searches;
prevented from praying and sometimes deprived of his Koran; and blocked from communicating
with his defense attorney. Id. at 149.
26. Id. at 150.
27. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *9. Judge Gleeson also noted an obligation to accept
as true all of Iqbal‘s factual allegations and to construe all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id.
(citing Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1992)).
28. Id. at *10–11 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also id. (citing
McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 434, 436, 443 (2d Cir. 2004), for the proposition that a
qualified immunity defense, though possible on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, presents a
formidable procedural hurdle for defendants).
29. Id. at *11 (―The expectation that a defendant will assert qualified immunity as a defense
does not elevate a plaintiff‘s pleading requirements.‖ (citing McKenna, 386 F.3d at 434)).
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the ―personal involvement‖ of a supervisor must consist of an actual, direct
constitutional violation, knowledge of and failure to remedy a wrong, the
creation or sanction of an unconstitutional policy or custom, grossly
negligent supervision of subordinates who commit constitutional torts, or
failure to act upon receiving information regarding unconstitutional acts.30
In other words, ―[m]ere linkage‖ in the chain of command could not
provide a sufficient basis for supervisory liability.31
Noting that the parties disagreed as to how ―specific‖ and
―‗nonconclusory‘‖ an allegation of personal involvement must be, Judge
Gleeson reasoned that a tension exists between Rule 8‘s liberal pleading
standards and qualified immunity‘s core purpose of protecting government
officials from the burdens of discovery in unmeritorious litigation.32 Judge
Gleeson acknowledged that the Supreme Court had repeatedly declined to
raise the pleading standard,33 and had (1) endorsed a liberal reading of Rule
8 as requiring no more than ―fair notice,‖ (2) concluded that courts should
construe all inferences in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, including
inferences that would defeat an immunity defense, (3) emphasized that
factual disputes regarding qualified immunity should be resolved as early in
the litigation as possible, and (4) suggested that limited discovery may be
required to resolve such a dispute.34
As a result, Judge Gleeson refused to dismiss Iqbal‘s due process
claim against Ashcroft and Mueller. 35 He reasoned that Iqbal had
sufficiently asserted the existence of a clearly established liberty interest
and that he had adequately pled personal involvement of the high-level
government officials.36 Moreover, the available evidence was so limited

30. Id. at *14. Judge Gleeson rejected Ashcroft‘s blanket argument that he should not be
subject to liability on the basis of ―‗special factors‘‖ in the post-September 11th context militating
against the provision of a Bivens remedy. Id. The court of appeals agreed. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at
159–60.
31. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *15.
32. Id. at *11.
33. Id. at *11 & n.13 (deeming the current Rule 8 pleading standard ―permissive‖).
34. Id. at *13.
35. Id. at *17, *21. Judge Gleeson also rejected Ashcroft‘s suggestion that ―as a matter of
law, constitutional and statutory rights must be suspended during times of crisis‖ and national
emergency. Id. at *18. Conceding that Ashcroft‘s argument, which reasoned that the postSeptember 11th context justified departure from usual BOP standards, might ultimately persuade a
court not to impose liability, the judge concluded that a determination of whether the defendants‘
actions were reasonable could not be made on a motion to dismiss. Id. at *19.
36. Id. at *19–21 (citing Nuclear Transport & Storage, Inc. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1348,
1355 (6th Cir. 1989), for the proposition that ordinarily the mere assertion that high-level
government officials had created an unconstitutional policy would not sufficiently suggest
personal involvement to state a claim, but reasoning that the post-September 11th context
provided enough support for Iqbal‘s assertion to warrant some discovery because the need for
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that Judge Gleeson was reluctant to grant defendants‘ motion without some
discovery, especially since ―the extent of defendants‘ involvement is
peculiarly within their knowledge.‖37 To mitigate concerns animating the
qualified immunity doctrine, however, Judge Gleeson limited initial
discovery to the issue of defendants‘ personal involvement.38
Turning finally to Iqbal‘s First and Fifth Amendment claims of
religious and racial discrimination, Judge Gleeson explained that although
proof of discriminatory intent is required for a plaintiff to prevail under
equal protection principles, no such proof is required at the pleading
stage.39 Because he could not conclude that there existed ―no set of facts‖
consistent with Iqbal‘s allegation that Ashcroft was the ―principle architect‖
of the discriminatory policy that could establish the latter‘s liability, Judge
Gleeson also refused to dismiss these claims.40
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the supervisory defendants
challenged on qualified immunity grounds the district court‘s refusal to
dismiss Iqbal‘s claims against them. 41 Agreeing with Judge Gleeson‘s
legal conclusions, including his explanation of supervisory liability, the
court of appeals echoed the district court‘s suggestion that the proper
pleading standard required ―to overcome a qualified immunity defense‖
was an ―unsettled question.‖42 Utilizing a newer standard than had Judge
Gleeson,43 the court relied on three somewhat conflicting Supreme Court
cases 44 and noted that most circuits had rejected a generally applicable
heightened pleading standard—until the Supreme Court‘s decision in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.45

immediate, authoritative action made it more likely that high-level officials were personally
involved in creating and/or implementing the detention policy).
37. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *20–21.
38. Id. at *21.
39. Id. at *28–29.
40. Id.
41. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2007). The only defendants to appeal the
district court‘s order were supervisory officials. Id. at 152.
42. Id. at 152–53.
43. In 2007, the Supreme Court abrogated the ―no set of facts‖ standard that Judge Gleeson
had correctly applied to Iqbal‘s case in 2005. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
562–63 (2007).
44. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 153–55 (parsing through and synthesizing the analyses of
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993),
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), and Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574
(1998)).
45. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155 (noting the First Circuit‘s assertion in Educadores
Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2004), that Swierkiewicz had
resolved in the negative any lingering question whether a heightened pleading standard may still
be possible after Crawford-El).
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Twombly, the court opined, had created ―[c]onsiderable uncertainty‖
regarding the proper pleading standard for motions to dismiss because
conflicting ―signals‖ in the opinion could imply either that the new
plausibility standard should be construed narrowly, applying only to
antitrust cases, or broadly, subjecting all civil actions to ―a new and
heightened pleading standard.‖ 46 Carefully analyzing these conflicting
signals, the court concluded that the Supreme Court had not meant to
announce a universally heightened standard but intended instead to require
a flexible plausibility standard demanding amplified factual allegations only
―in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim
plausible.‖47
In so concluding, the court acknowledged that Ashcroft and Mueller‘s
argument for a heightened pleading standard in Iqbal‘s case had some merit
to the extent that such a standard would support the important privilege of
qualified immunity while blocking generalized allegations of supervisory
liability with the potential to create the exact discovery burdens that
qualified immunity was designed to prevent. 48 The court declined to
impose such a standard but noted that courts denying 12(b)(6) motions by
government officials claiming immunity should structure and manage
discovery to shield the officials from expensive, time-consuming
litigation.49
Accepting Iqbal‘s factual allegations as true and applying Twombly‘s
plausibility standard, the court dismissed the procedural due process
claims.50 Reasoning that Iqbal had sufficiently alleged both the violation of
a constitutional right and the personal involvement of the relevant
defendants—including Ashcroft and Mueller—in violating that right, the
court concluded that there was a legitimate question as to whether the right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. 51 As to the
equal protection claims, the court found that Iqbal‘s allegation that his
classification and confinement were solely race-based was sufficient to
state a claim of objectively illegal animus-based discrimination, Ashcroft
and Mueller‘s assertion of qualified immunity notwithstanding.52 Noting
that the Supreme Court had specifically rejected a heightened pleading
46. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155.
47. Id. at 157–58 (failing to elaborate on or give examples of contexts that would require
amplified pleading).
48. Id. at 158–59 (underscoring a district court‘s obligation to manage cases with a qualified
immunity defense in such a way as to ―protect the substance‖ of that defense).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 164–68 (reasoning that dismissal is warranted when there exists a legitimate
question as to whether there is an exception to a constitutional requirement).
51. Id. at 167–68.
52. Id. at 174.
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requirement for improperly motivated civil rights violations, the court
turned to the issue of personal involvement to conclude that Iqbal‘s
assertions that Ashcroft had designed the discriminatory policy and that
Ashcroft and Mueller had condoned and agreed to it were sufficiently
plausible.53
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide
(1) whether Iqbal‘s complaint had sufficiently stated a claim that petitioners
Ashcroft and Mueller had deprived him of a constitutional right, and (2)
whether a high-ranking government official may be held liable for
unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the basis of knowledge and
acquiescence in those acts.54
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Pleading practice in the United States developed from an archaic set of
technical requirements to a lenient and long-lasting regime based on fair
55
notice that was memorialized in the landmark case Conley v. Gibson. In
2007, the Supreme Court shattered this regime with its decision in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, which introduced a new plausibility standard for
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and whose interpretation and
potential scope created a significant amount of confusion in the lower
56
federal courts.
While the Court has traditionally taken the view that
procedural rules should be amended through the official federal rulemaking
process rather than from the bench, Justice Kennedy has suggested that a
heightened pleading standard may be appropriate in the context of a
57
qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity is a doctrine that seeks
to balance the goal of preventing disruptive litigation against government
officials against justice‘s demand in some instances for limited pre58
dismissal discovery.

53. Id. at 175–76 (echoing Judge Gleeson‘s reasoning that the post-September 11th context
increased the likelihood that high-level government officials would have been personally involved
in designing and implementing confinement policies for people who were arrested on federal
charges in the New York City area and then classified as ―of high interest‖ in terrorism
investigations).
54. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955–56 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at *29, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015)). Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy asserted that the case turned on the narrower question of whether Iqbal had pled
―factual matter that, if taken as true, state[d] a claim that [Ashcroft and Mueller] deprived him of
his clearly established constitutional rights.‖ Id. at 1942–43 (majority opinion).
55. See infra Part II.A.
56. See infra Part II.B–C.
57. See infra Part II.D.
58. See infra Part II.E.
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A. The Evolution of Pleading: From Archaic Codes and Common Law
to the Advent of Rule 8 and the Notice Regime
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is the product of an ongoing
procedural evolution. United States pleading practice developed from an
arcane, oppressive set of common-law and Code procedures into a proplaintiff approach under which a complaint survived dismissal unless it
failed to give the defendant fair but general notice of the claim. 59 Once the
Court officially announced this construction of Rule 8 in Conley v.
Gibson,60 however, the pleading standard evolution came to an apparent
end.61
At common law, a ―Byzantine‖62 pleading system required plaintiffs
to navigate a complex series of highly scientific-like requirements dictating
how to properly recite claims and relevant legal issues.63 Pleadings that
failed to adhere to these technical constraints were swiftly dismissed, such
that the system‘s formal rigidity trumped the promotion of justice through
principled decisions based on the merits of each case.64 In America, the
ancient pleading system was first reformed in 1848 with the enactment of
the New York Field Codes. 65 The Codes, which shifted the substantive
core of pleading practice from issues to facts, required plaintiffs to submit
―a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting each cause of action
without unnecessary repetition.‖ 66 Like the common-law system, the
Codes eventually revealed defects, most notably the underlying assumption
59. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1202, at 89–92 (3d ed. 2004).
60. 355 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1957) (explaining that the Rules require only that the plaintiff ―give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‘s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests‖).
61. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor their judicial interpretation departed
from notice pleading until 2007. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63
(2007) (―Conley‘s ‗no set of facts‘ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away
long enough.‖).
62. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573–74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the language
of Rule 8 was ―not inadvertent,‖ but rather an intentional response to the difficulties associated
with hyper-technical English and American pleading rules from the mid-nineteenth century).
63. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1202, at 90 (explaining that the ―maze‖ of
common-law pleading requirements was premised on the assumption that ―eventually the dispute
would be reduced to a single issue of law or fact that would dispose of the case‖).
64. Id. at 90–92. See generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 53–57, 76–79, 86–90 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the early English writ system, the first
form of pleading practice, and the decline of the common-law system of pleading, which resulted
from its inflexibility).
65. See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 21–22
(2d ed. 1947) (―In this country the movement for pleading reform resulted in the adoption of the
New York [Field] Code of 1848, the mode and forerunner of all the practice codes in states which
have adopted code pleading.‖).
66. Id. at 210 (citing N.Y. CODE CIV. P. § 481).
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that plaintiffs could compartmentalize facts and conclusions at the first
stage of litigation. 67 Fact pleading under the Codes ultimately became
unworkable, having imposed enormous time and cost expenditures in
litigating inconsequential procedural issues.68
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938, Rule
8 was designed to respond to the technical deficiencies of both the common
law and the Codes: The drafters intentionally excluded references to both
―facts‖ and ―causes of action.‖69 In so doing, the drafters also abolished the
problematic formal distinction between facts and conclusions. 70 Having
only been amended twice since its promulgation,71 Rule 8(a)(2) requires ―a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.‖72 This intentionally simplified standard was complemented by Rule
8‘s explicit directive of interpretive flexibility: Pleadings must be construed
in such a way as to promote and achieve justice.73
Because the drafters of the Federal Rules sought to expand access to
the courts, they used Rule 8 to clear away the confusion and injustice of
rigid procedural rules ―so that the sunlight of substance might shine
through.‖74 Pleading under Rule 8 did not demand detailed allegations that
would ultimately prove a claim but only required enough information to

67. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1218, at 265.
68. Id. § 1202, at 91–92.
69. Id. § 1216, at 207–08 (explaining that the drafters ―obviously felt that the use of a new
formulation would . . . destroy the viability of the old code precedents, which were a source of
considerable confusion, and encourage a more flexible approach by the courts in defining the
concept of claim for relief‖).
70. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574–75 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that because Rule 8 was enacted in direct response to the difficulty of distinguishing
between facts and legal conclusions, its drafters self-consciously avoided any reference to these
terms); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 3–4 (9th Cir. 1963) (―[O]ne
purpose of Rule 8 was to get away from the highly technical distinction between statements of
fact and conclusions of law . . . .‖); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int‘l Union v. Delta Ref. Co.,
277 F.2d 694, 697 (6th Cir. 1960) (suggesting that under notice pleading, ―the ancient distinction
between pleading ‗facts‘ and ‗conclusions‘ is no longer significant‖).
71. The Court has only ordered amendments to Rule 8 three times since the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were first enacted; Rule 8(a)(2) was only affected by two of those orders and has
never been amended substantively. See 113 F.R.D. 189, 194–95 (1987) (making technical
changes); 39 F.R.D. 69, 214 (1966) (amending Rule 8(e) only); Order of the Supreme Court of the
United
States,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/PendingRules/ProposedSupCt040
7.aspx (effective Dec. 1, 2007) (making stylistic changes).
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
73. See WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 59, § 1202, at 97 (referring to Rule 8(f), which
provides that ―all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice‖).
74. Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988).
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give the defendant and the court notice of that claim. 75 As a result, modern
pleading practice became known as ―notice pleading.‖ 76 According to
Judge Charles E. Clark, the principal architect of the Federal Rules, giving
notice meant setting forth the general nature and basis of a claim to clarify
the act or event a plaintiff sought to litigate. 77 The new, simplified
pleading standard was, moreover, complemented and enabled by the
introduction of liberal discovery rules and other pretrial procedures, which
allowed litigants who had given proper notice of their claims to gather
evidence regarding the specific legal issues on which their case would
ultimately turn. 78 In 1954, a few years before its landmark case of the
notice pleading regime—Conley v. Gibson79—the Court paved the way for
that decision by implicitly endorsing a minimalist pleading standard.80 In
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass’n of Chicago, the Court
suggested that a complaint could actually be ―too long and too detailed in
view of the modern practice looking to simplicity and reasonable brevity in
pleading.‖81
In Conley, the Supreme Court definitively interpreted Rule 8 and
clarified its interaction with Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss 82 : ―[A]
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

75. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1202, at 89–90.
76. Although the drafters did not use the term ―notice pleading,‖ Charles E. Clark, Pleading
Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958), the Supreme Court did so in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) (―Such simplified ‗notice pleading‘ is made possible by the
liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules . . . .‖).
The Court has also included the term ―simplified‖ in describing the appropriate standard. See,
e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (―Rule 8(a)‘s simplified pleading
standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions.‖).
77. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460–61 (1943) (espousing the
necessity of simple, direct procedural rules that, in addressing only the ―broad outlines‖ of a case,
do not allow form to rise above substance).
78. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (explaining that the ―simplified notice pleading
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions‖); Conley, 355 U.S. at
47 (noting that ―simplified ‗notice pleading‘ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for
discovery and the other pretrial procedures‖); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (―The
new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the
deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial.‖).
79. 355 U.S. 41.
80. See United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass‘n of Chi., 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954)
(embracing a simplistic pleading standard).
81. Id.
82. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) grants parties the right to move for dismissal of
complaints that ―fail[] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.‖ FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6).
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of his claim which would entitle him to relief.‖83 Plaintiff-petitioners were
African-American railroad employees who sued their union and some of its
officers under the Railway Labor Act for unfair bargaining-agent
representation after they had been discharged or demoted, allegedly on the
basis of race.84 In response to the Union‘s argument that the employees‘
complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to support a general allegation of
discrimination, the Court reasoned that because the underlying purpose of
pleading is to foster adjudication on the merits, the Federal Rules did not
require detailed factual allegations.85 To withstand a motion to dismiss, the
Court concluded, a complaint must only allege enough information to give
the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff‘s claims and their grounds. 86
Therefore, the employees‘ allegations that the railroad had wrongfully
discharged them and that the Union had because of their race refused to
assist them in dealing with their grievances provided sufficient notice to
defeat the Union‘s motion to dismiss.87
Until Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,88 the Court consistently applied
Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ standard—or its underlying rationale—to
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.89 Accordingly, the Court
determined that the task of evaluating a complaint before discovery was a
necessarily limited undertaking that required judges to carefully distinguish
between complaints that were sufficiently pleaded but that suggested an
improbability that the claimant would succeed on the merits, and
complaints that actually failed to sufficiently state a claim. 90 In
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 91 for instance, the Court affirmed that the

83. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 562–63, 570 (2007) (abrogating Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ language but purporting not
to raise the pleading standard).
84. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43.
85. Id. at 47–48.
86. Id at 47.
87. Id. at 45–46.
88. 550 U.S. 544.
89. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (citing Conley for the
proposition that ―[t]he liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified
pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim‖). In fact, even
after Twombly, the Court referred approvingly to Conley‘s notice pleading standard. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing language from Conley quoted in Twombly to assert that a
complaint need only ―‗give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests‘‖ (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
90. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (―The issue is not whether a plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.
Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but
that is not the test.‖).
91. 534 U.S. 506.

2010]

ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

81

simplified standard of Rule 8 applied to all civil actions and had been
adopted to shift the focus of litigation from the art of pleading claims to the
merits involved in adjudicating them.92 Further, in Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,93 the Court rejected as
inconsistent with the liberal system of notice pleading the Fifth Circuit‘s
requirement that plaintiffs suing government officials likely to evoke a
qualified immunity defense must ―state with factual detail and particularity
the basis for the claim‖ as well as the basis for a rebuttal to the immunity
argument.94 The Court declined to adopt the challengers‘ rationale that this
requirement did not constitute a heightened pleading standard because the
Federal Rules demand varying degrees of factual specificity depending on
the substantive complexities of the legal doctrines underlying the plaintiff‘s
claims.95
The lower federal courts adopted the Supreme Court‘s pleading
pronouncements. In a case decided only one month before Twombly, Judge
Easterbrook underscored the Seventh Circuit‘s understanding of the Court‘s
construction of Rule 8 by cautioning district court judges considering
motions to dismiss to be vigilant in demanding nothing more from a
complaint than notice. 96 According to Judge Easterbrook, Rule 8
demanded neither facts nor legal theories, both of which would emerge later
in the litigation process.97 The judge concluded that 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss should be granted only when a complaint fails to state a legally
cognizable claim.98
B. From Notice to Plausibility: In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the
Court Departed from Conley v. Gibson’s Long-Standing “No Set of

92. Id. at 514–15.
93. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
94. Id. at 167–68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id.
96. Vincent v. City Colleges of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2007) (―Any decision
declaring ‗this complaint is deficient because it does not allege X‘ is a candidate for summary
reversal, unless X is on the list in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Kolupa v. Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2006))). Later in the opinion,
Judge Easterbrook offered even more specific advice on this score, suggesting that ―[a]ny district
judge (for that matter, any defendant) tempted to write ‗this complaint is deficient because it does
not contain . . .‘ should stop and think: What rule of law requires a complaint to contain that
allegation?‖ Id. at 924 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706,
708 (7th Cir. 2005)).
97. Id. at 923 (reasoning that a complaint‘s indication of ―the possibility that facts to be
adduced later, and consistent with the complaint, could prove the claim‖ precludes pre-discovery
dismissal).
98. Id. at 924.
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Facts” Language and Adopted a Plausibility Pleading Standard in
the Context of an Antitrust Action
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 99 the Supreme Court abrogated
Conley‘s oft-quoted ―no set of facts‖ interpretation of Rule 8, reasoning that
the phrase had been often and problematically taken out of context by the
lower courts and that it had been ―questioned, criticized, and explained
away long enough.‖100 The Twombly plaintiff-respondents were consumers
of local telephone and/or high-speed Internet services who sued Bell
Atlantic and other Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (―ILEC‖)—regional
service monopolies—under Section 1 of the Sherman Act in a putative class
action101 for conspiracy to restrain trade.102 Writing for the Court, Justice
Souter found the allegation that the telecommunications providers had
―engaged in parallel conduct‖ insufficient to state an antitrust violation and
therefore held that the complaint should be dismissed. 103 In so holding,
Justice Souter considered the complaint under a new standard that enabled
him to declare that an assertion of parallel conduct alone did not plausibly
suggest an unlawful conspiracy on the part of the ILECs.104
To replace Conley‘s (mis)interpretation of Rule 8, the Court
introduced new language declaring that a complaint will only withstand
dismissal if it includes, on its face, ―allegations plausibly suggesting (not
merely consistent with)‖ liability.105 Plausibility, Justice Souter explained,
implies neither probability 106 nor conceivability, 107 but falls somewhere
between the two and cannot be based on conclusory assertions that would
require a judge to speculate about whether the plaintiff is entitled to

99. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Court framed its reason for granting certiorari narrowly: ―[T]o
address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel
conduct.‖ Id. at 553.
100. Id. at 562–63 (retiring the ―puzzling‖ phrase as one ―best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may
be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint‖).
101. Id. at 550, 559 (noting the potentially exorbitant discovery costs associated with a case in
which ―plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local
telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United States‖).
102. Id. at 550. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits ―[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
103. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (concluding that plaintiffs had not ―nudged their claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible‖).
104. See id. at 564–70 (noting that ―we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face‖).
105. Id. at 556–57 (explaining that a facially plausible pleading ―simply calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal‖ activity).
106. Id. at 556.
107. Id. at 570.

2010]

ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

83

relief. 108 Like labels and conclusions, ―a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action‖ cannot alone give rise to a plausible
inference of liability.109 The Court explicitly rejected any requirement of
―heightened fact pleading of specifics‖ and framed the decision as a logical
extension of the Court‘s pleading philosophy rather than a departure from
it.110
Justice Stevens dissented, 111 asserting that the Court‘s plausibility
test—which he interpreted as a ―dramatic departure from settled procedural
[standards]‖ 112 —was not a legally acceptable basis for dismissing a
complaint.113 Examining the history of Rule 8,114 Justice Stevens pointed
out that plaintiffs had difficulty distinguishing among facts, evidence, and
conclusions under the Codes and suggested that rather than a bright line
separating a conceivable complaint from a plausible one, there existed a
pleading ―continuum varying only in the degree of particularity with which
the occurrences are described.‖115 After rebutting the majority‘s suggestion
that Conley had put an ―incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading
standard,‖ 116 Justice Stevens concluded that the Court had actually
heightened that standard117 from possibility to plausibility.118
108. Id. at 555–56.
109. Id. at 555. Applying the plausibility standard to the facts of the case, Justice Souter first
outlined the substantive legal requirements underlying the plaintiff‘s claim of an antitrust
violation. Id. at 553–54. He then reasoned that allegations of parallel conduct, without any
assertion of an actual agreement or conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade, did not give rise to
the plausible inference of a Section 1 Sherman Act violation. Id. at 564–70.
110. Id. at 570.
111. Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by Justice Ginsberg, except as to Part IV, which
criticized the majority‘s method of statutory interpretation as applied to Twombly for ignoring
Congress‘s intent in enacting the Sherman Act in order to advance its own policy agenda of
―protecting antitrust defendants . . . from the burdens of pretrial discovery.‖ Id. at 547, 595–97
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 573 (arguing that the insertion of plausibility into the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis ―seems
to be driven by the majority‘s appraisal of the plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation rather
than its legal sufficiency‖).
113. Id. at 571.
114. Id. at 573–76 (asserting that Conley must be understood in this context). Justice Stevens
lamented Conley‘s interment and pointed out in ―eulogy‖ that the majority opinion ―is the first by
any Member of this Court to express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation.‖ Id.
at 577–78.
115. Id. at 574 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H.
Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518,
520–21 (1957)).
116. Id. at 579. First, Justice Stevens explained that, because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure neither encourage nor require the pleading of facts, the Conley Court would have
understood the majority‘s introduction of plausibility as erroneously imposing an evidentiary
standard at the pleading stage. Id. at 579–80 & n.6 (conceding that the majority was correct in
asserting that Rule 8 requires only a ―‗showing‘‖ that plaintiff is entitled to relief, and suggesting
that ―[w]hether and to what extent that ‗showing‘ requires allegations of fact will depend on the
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C. Twombly Created Considerable Confusion in the Lower Courts
and Set the Stage for Supreme Court Clarification
Twombly instigated a considerable amount of debate and speculation
in the lower federal courts regarding the scope of the new pleading standard
and the meaning of plausibility.119 Although the courts generally applied
Twombly outside of the federal antitrust context, they did so to varying
degrees. 120 More importantly, some courts found that a plausibility
requirement squared well with long-standing principles of notice pleading
while others interpreted it as a significant departure.121 Regardless of how
a court ultimately construed Twombly, however, each attempted ―neither to
over-read nor to under-read‖ the Supreme Court‘s new language.122

particulars of the claim‖). Second, Justice Stevens noted that Conley developed a minimum
standard with which a complaint must comply to withstand dismissal, not a standard dictating
what a plaintiff may include in a complaint. Id. at 580.
117. See id. at 588, 596 (calling Twombly a ―Big Case‖ that tempted the majority into
succumbing to the temptation of imposing a heightened pleading standard, which ―previous
Courts [had] steadfastly resisted,‖ and asserting ―that the Court has announced a significant new
rule that does not even purport to respond to any congressional command is glaringly obvious‖ in
light of the decision‘s ―transparent policy concern‖ of protecting antitrust defendants).
118. Id. at 591–93 (rejecting the Court‘s notion that any inference of antitrust conspiracy based
on the allegation of parallel conduct is implausible and asserting that such inferences ―sit[]
comfortably within the realm of possibility,‖ which is ―all the Rules require‖). Justice Stevens
concluded that ―in the final analysis,‖ the Court‘s decision reflects ―only a lack of confidence in
the ability of trial judges to control discovery.‖ Id. at 596.
119. E.g., Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 541–42 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting
confusion over Twombly‘s scope but declining to take a position, as doing so was unnecessary for
resolution of the case).
120. Compare Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 48, 54–55 (3d Cir.
2007) (applying Twombly to affirm a motion for summary judgment under the New Jersey
Antitrust Act), with Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286–87 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying
Twombly to a § 1983 action to hold that a former prisoner‘s complaint failed to state a claim
against the former city chief of police for unconstitutional denial of access to DNA evidence).
121. See Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure & Fed. Practice as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 4, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2008) (No. 07-1015) (―Compare
Aktieselkaet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (‗Twombly
leaves the longstanding fundamentals of notice pleading intact.‘), with Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Union Pacific RR Co., 537 F.3d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J., and
Posner, J., concurring) (‗In Bell Atlantic the Justices modified federal pleading requirements and
threw out a complaint that would have been deemed sufficient earlier.‘‖)). The Professors argued
that the Court in Twombly did not ―endorse or apply‖ a heightened pleading standard, id. at 7–8,
and reasoned that the implausibility of Twombly‘s complaint ―was a product of substantive law
filtered through unremarkable pleading standards,‖ id. at 11.
122. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 2008). The Tenth Circuit, one of
the few circuits attempting to put into its own words what the Supreme Court meant by
―plausibility,‖ found that ―the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some
set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court
reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for
these claims.‖ Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Judge Ripple of the Seventh Circuit asserted in Tamayo v. Blagojevich
that the Court had not intended to supercede the basic notice-pleading
standard and assumed that Twombly applied to various types of civil
actions.123 According to Judge Ripple, Twombly had not heightened the
pleading standard but had established that a complaint must pass ―‗two
easy-to-clear hurdles‘‖ to survive a motion to dismiss: First, the complaint
must contain enough factual detail to give the defendant ―fair notice‖ of the
plaintiff‘s claims and their grounds; second, that factual detail must also
―plausibly suggest‖ that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 124 The court
interpreted the Supreme Court‘s ―explicit praise of Form 9 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure‖ as suggesting that some conclusory statements
might permissibly contribute to a plausible inference of entitlement to
relief.125
The plaintiff in Tamayo had sued her employers, the Illinois Gaming
Board and the Illinois Department of Revenue, and individual defendants,
including Governor Blagojevich, under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and
Section 1983 for retaliation and gender-based discrimination.126 Tamayo
alleged that her employers had reneged on a promised salary, treated her
differently from and paid her less than similarly situated male employees—
in part because she was a woman—and subjected her to various,
specifically identified ―adverse employment actions‖ on account of her
gender and in response to her complaints about lack of equal pay and her
filing of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge.127 Judge
Ripple concluded that Tamayo‘s complaint had alleged sufficient facts with
respect to her sex discrimination and retaliation claims, reasoning that the
allegations put the defendants on adequate notice of her claims, which she
had not attempted to obfuscate.128
Like Judge Ripple, Judge Archer of the Federal Circuit concluded in
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp. that Twombly‘s abrogation of Conley‘s ―no
set of facts‖ language did not suggest that the Court had changed the

123. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1082–83; see also McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354,
1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that the Court‘s abrogation of Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖
language ―does not suggest that Bell Atlantic changed the pleading requirement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 as articulated in Conley‖ and noting that, in fact, ―Bell Atlantic favorably quoted
Conley‖).
124. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084 (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773,
776 (7th Cir. 2007)).
125. Id. at 1084–85 (suggesting, for instance, that a negligence complaint could survive
dismissal without stating ―the respects in which the defendant was alleged to be negligent (i.e.,
driving too fast, driving drunk, etc.)‖).
126. Id. at 1080.
127. Id. at 1085.
128. Id. at 1085–86.
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pleading requirements of Rule 8 ―as articulated in Conley.‖129 In McZeal,
the pro se plaintiff sued Sprint Nextel Corporation and Nextel
Communications, Inc. for patent and trademark infringement, setting forth
his allegations in a ninety-five page, twenty-four count complaint. 130
Reasoning that McZeal only had access to Sprint‘s public statements and
advertisements, Judge Archer concluded that McZeal‘s allegation that one
of Sprint Nextel‘s products was the logical equivalent of his invention—an
international walkie talkie—contained sufficient detail to allow the
corporation to answer the complaint with respect to the patent infringement
claim.131 Specifics about how the allegedly infringing product worked, the
court reasoned, would emerge through discovery.132
Although he noted that that courts may ―grant leeway‖ to pro se
plaintiffs on procedural matters,133 Judge Archer also referred broadly to
the pleading standard, suggesting that even after Twombly, a complaint will
withstand dismissal so long as it provides the defendant with ―enough detail
to allow the defendants to answer.‖134 Rejecting the majority‘s view, Judge
Dyk concluded that under the new pleading standard announced in
Twombly, McZeal‘s bare, conclusory allegations of patent infringement
were insufficient to provide Sprint with any meaningful notice under the
doctrine of equivalents,135 and therefore should not be permitted to subject
Sprint to expensive and time-consuming discovery.136
Seeking to reconcile the long-standing notice requirement with
Twombly‘s new additions to the pleading standard, Judge Nygaard
explained for the Third Circuit in Phillips v. County of Allegheny137 that
what made Twombly‘s impact on Rule 12(b)(6) so confusing was the fact
that the new plausibility paradigm had been introduced alongside the
seemingly conflicting assertion that the Court was not actually changing the

129. 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that the Court in Twombly had quoted
Conley favorably).
130. Id. at 1355.
131. Id. at 1357. As for the trademark infringement claim, Judge Archer rejected the district
court‘s basis for dismissing McZeal‘s complaint, asserting that whether the trademark was
generic, and therefore invalid, was a factual question that could not be decided on a motion to
dismiss. Id. at 1358.
132. Id. at 1358.
133. Id. at 1356.
134. Id. at 1357.
135. The doctrine of equivalents, in essence, prevents patent fraud. See Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–10 (1950) (establishing the modern doctrine of
equivalents).
136. McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1361 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008).
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framework for Rules 8 or 12(b)(6). 138 According to Judge Nygaard,
Twombly introduced two new concepts to the assessment of a civil
complaint. 139 First, the Court introduced new language, such as the
―showing‖ required to demonstrate entitlement to relief; second, the Court
renounced old language, that is, Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ passage. 140
Attempting to make sense of Twombly‘s ―confusing‖ and ―‗conflicting
signals,‘‖141 the Judge explained that insufficient factual allegations in a
complaint could not withstand dismissal because such allegations could not
provide the defendant with sufficient notice.142 The Judge noted that the
Supreme Court had carefully rooted its analysis of and departure from
Conley in accepted principles and concluded that Twombly had not
shattered the notice pleading standard.143
In Phillips, an administratix sued numerous defendants under Section
1983 in relation to the murder of her son Mark Phillips and his girlfriend,
Gretchen Ferderbar, by Ferderbar‘s ex-boyfriend Michael Michalski, an
Allegheny County 911 call center dispatcher.144 The defendants included
Daniel Nussbaum, Michalski‘s supervisor, and Danielle Tush and Brian
Craig, other dispatchers.145 Michalski had secretly used the call center‘s
computer network to obtain information about the whereabouts of
Ferderbar and Phillips.146 When Nussbaum initially became aware of this,
he suspended Michalski for one week.147 During the suspension, Tush and
Craig assisted Michalski in obtaining unauthorized information about the
victims from the call center database.148 Ferderbar learned of Michalski‘s
actions and notified Nussbaum, who terminated Michalski and then
contacted Ferderbar and a local police department to warn them about
Michalski‘s volatile state. 149 Later that day, Michalski phoned the call

138. Id. at 230.
139. Id. at 231–32.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 234 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007)).
142. Id. at 232 (contrasting the necessary ―showing‖ to a ―blanket assertion of entitlement to
relief‖).
143. Id. at 233. Like the Third and Seventh Circuits, the Second Circuit recognized
―conflicting signals‖ in Twombly that created uncertainty as to the opinion‘s intended scope.
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157–58 & n.7 (concluding that Twombly was not limited to antitrust cases and
reasoning that ―it would be cavalier to believe that the Court‘s rejection of the ‗no set of facts‘
language from Conley . . . applies only to section 1 antitrust claims‖).
144. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228–29 (3d Cir. 2008).
145. Id. at 229.
146. Id. at 228.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 229.
149. Id.
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center, saying he had ―‗nothing left to live for‘‖ and that Ferderbar and
Phillips were going to ―‗pay for putting him in his present situation,‘‖ but
neither Tush nor Craig nor any other dispatcher took any action to warn
Ferderbar or to notify the police.150 That evening, Michalski tracked down
and shot Ferderbar and Phillips.151
Judge Nygaard applied Twombly and analyzed the complaint under the
four-part test of the state-created danger theory.152 The judge found that
the claims were pled insufficiently against Nussbaum because they did not
allege that he had acted affirmatively.153 As for Tush and Craig, however,
the judge concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged that both
dispatchers had acted affirmatively in providing Michalski with
unauthorized call center information and that there was a direct causal
relationship between this action and the murders, since Michalski had used
the call center information to locate the victims. 154 In addition, the
complaint alleged that Tush and Craig were actually aware of the risk of
harm, since they knew that Mikulski was in a distraught mental state as a
result of his break-up with Ferderbar.155 Finally, the complaint sufficiently
established that Tush and Craig had acted with deliberate indifference,
which raised their culpability to the level of conscience-shocking and
satisfied the final prong of the test. 156 Therefore, under Twombly, the
district court erred in dismissing Phillips‘s claims against the
dispatchers.157
Erickson v. Pardus, 158 a brief per curiam decision issued by the
Supreme Court only a few weeks after Twombly, 159 added further
confusion to the debate over Twombly‘s scope and meaning. In Erickson, a
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 235. The state-created danger theory is an exception to the general rule that States
have no obligation to act affirmatively to protect their citizens. Under the four-part test, a plaintiff
must plead and prove:
(1) the harm ultimately caused to the plaintiff was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the
state-actor acted in willful disregard for the plaintiff‘s safety; (3) there was some
relationship between the state and the plaintiff; and (4) the state-actor used his authority
to create an opportunity for danger that otherwise would not have existed.
Id.
153. Id. at 236. Rather than affirming the district court‘s dismissal of the claims against
Nussbaum, Judge Nygaard remanded them to give Phillips an opportunity to amend the
complaint. Id.
154. Id. at 237.
155. Id. at 238.
156. Id. at 241.
157. Id. at 243.
158. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
159. Twombly was decided on May 21, 2007. Erickson was decided on June 4.
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Section 1983 action against medic prison officials that turned on the
sufficiency of a pro se complaint,160 the Court quoted Conley, via Twombly,
in acknowledging the ―fair notice‖ standard and reasoned that a Rule 8
―[short and plain] statement need only ‗give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‘‖ 161
Emphasizing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth ―liberal
pleading standards,‖ the Court rejected the contention that Erickson‘s
allegations were ―too conclusory‖ to state Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment violations for cruel and unusual punishment. 162 The Court
reasoned that the allegations in Erickson‘s complaint—that a prison doctor
had removed him from a year-long hepatitis C treatment program, that
prison officials refused to provide necessary medical treatment, and that
lack of treatment endangered his life—were sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2),
even without Erickson‘s additional, more specific allegations.163
D. Although the Court Has Often Declined to Amend the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure from the Bench, Preferring Instead to
Defer to the Official Rulemaking Process, Justice Kennedy Has
Endorsed the Possibility of a Heightened Standard in the Context of
a Qualified Immunity Defense
Since 1988, the Supreme Court has had the authority to prescribe
general rules of federal practice and procedure, so long as those rules do not
―abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.‖164 This does not mean,
however, that the Court has either the authority or the inclination to
announce or change federal procedural rules from the bench, as doing so
would comply neither with the mandates of the Rules Enabling Act165 nor
160. Id. at 94 .
161. Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957), as quoted in Twombly, for its construction of Rule 8(a)(2)).
162. Id. at 94.
163. Id.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (enacted as part of the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988)). The 1988 rule is essentially the same as
the original 1934 Rules Enabling Act promulgation, which provided that ―the Supreme Court of
the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the
United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings,
and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law.‖ Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat.
1064 (1934).
165. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1024–27 (1982) (offering ―a general reinterpretation of the Act in light of the pre-1934
history,‖ examining the implications of that interpretation and the adequacy of the Act in light of
it, and proposing procedural reform in the hopes of achieving ―a rational allocation of lawmaking
power between the Supreme Court and Congress‖). For a discussion of the respective rulemaking
roles of the Court and Congress, see Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1072 (1993).
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with traditional notions of judicial authority.166 Therefore, the Court has
consistently taken the position that procedural rules, especially those related
to pleading, discovery, and summary judgment, should be amended through
official rulemaking or legislative processes.167
In Gomez v. Toledo,168 the Court unanimously declined to revise the
pleading standard such that it would require plaintiffs to anticipate a
qualified immunity defense.169 Similarly, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 170 the Court addressed the
impropriety of judge-made amendments to Rule 8 and held that the Fifth
Circuit, in requiring that a complaint contain factual specificity, had
mistakenly implemented a judicially heightened pleading standard. 171
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist suggested that if Rule 8
were to be rewritten as a general matter, it might include a greater level of
specificity regarding the requirements for Section 1983 municipal
liability.172 He declined, however, to use the Court‘s authority to require
such specificity, on the grounds that a procedural shift as significant as a
heightened pleading standard should derive from amendments to the
Federal Rules and not from judicial interpretation.173
Citing Gomez and Leatherman, the Court in Crawford-El v. Britton
affirmed its reluctance to engage in judicial legislation by changing the
Federal Rules outside of the official rulemaking process.174 In CrawfordEl, the divided D.C. Circuit had concluded, first, that independent
government officials facing constitutional torts are entitled to pre-discovery
summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity—including the
question of the officer‘s mental state, if applicable—and second, that a
166. Cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 (1998) (―[T]o change the burden of proof
for an entire category of claims would stray far from the traditional limits on judicial authority.‖).
167. Id. at 595 (explaining that the Court has consistently and unanimously refused to engage
in judicial legislation to revise established procedural rules separate from the qualified immunity
defense); see also id. at 610 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (―[W]hether a defendant is entitled to
protection against the ‗peculiarly disruptive‘ inquiry into subjective intent should not depend on
the willingness or ability of a particular district court judge to limit inquiry through creative
application of the Federal Rules.‖).
168. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
169. Id. at 640.
170. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
171. Id. at 167–69.
172. Id. at 168.
173. Id.; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002) (―Whatever the
practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard
for employment discrimination suits. A requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is
a result that [requires legislative, not judicial, action].‖).
174. 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164–69; Gomez, 446 U.S. at
639–40).
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plaintiff must produce clear and convincing evidence of the officer‘s
improper motive to defeat a motion for summary judgment or directed
verdict.175 In rejecting both conclusions,176 Justice Stevens conceded that a
judge ―may insist that the plaintiff ‗put forward specific, nonconclusory
factual allegations‘ that establish improper motive causing cognizable
injury in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary
judgment,‖ regardless of whether the case includes an immunity defense.177
However, he also reiterated the Court‘s unanimous reluctance to resolve
questions about procedural standards other than through the rulemaking or
legislative processes, thereby distinguishing between a court‘s discretion in
individual case management and a court‘s ability to change procedural rules
as a general matter.178
In line with the Court‘s view, Justice Kennedy has asserted that the
authority to propose far-reaching procedural changes, even as a means of
advancing the Court‘s long-standing goal of shielding governmental
officials from trial and discovery, lies with Congress and not with the
judiciary. 179 In Siegert v. Gilley, 180 however, a Bivens case in which a
government employee alleged that his former supervisor had violated his
Fifth Amendment due process rights, Justice Kennedy advocated for a
heightened pleading standard in defamation cases against government
officials. 181 Such a standard, he reasoned, would resolve the tension
between the subjective element required to prove actual malice with respect
to the underlying substantive claim and the objective element involved in
the threshold question of qualified immunity.182 Moreover, a heightened
175. Id. at 583. A motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss are different
procedural tools with differing standards of review; motions for summary judgment are governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A pre-discovery motion for summary judgment, however,
is nearly the same as a pre-discovery motion to dismiss with respect to the issues relevant to this
Note‘s discussion of Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
176. First, Justice Stevens concluded that Harlow v. Fitzgerald, which eradicated the need to
prove unlawful intent with respect to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, did not
support the D.C. Circuit‘s conclusion that the need to prove unlawful intent was also unnecessary
for the underlying constitutional violation. Id. at 589. Second, he concluded that the lower
court‘s imposition of a heightened standard on the merits was at odds with the Court‘s consistent
hesitation to revise established rules independent of the immunity defense, id. at 594–95, and with
―traditional limits on judicial authority,‖ id. at 594.
177. Id. at 598 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
178. Id. at 595.
179. See, e.g., id. at 601 (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. Siegert, 500 U.S at 235 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that in light of the differences of opinion between the
majority and dissent, ―it is unwise to resolve [the issue of whether a liberty interest exists] without
the benefit of a decision by the Court of Appeals and full briefing and argument here‖).
180. 500 U.S. 226.
181. Id. at 235–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
182. Id.
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standard would better serve a fundamental purpose of the official immunity
doctrine—to avoid disruptive discovery.183 Justice Kennedy did not have
the votes for such a standard, however, and the Court held that the
plaintiff‘s complaint could not withstand dismissal because it had failed to
satisfy the threshold requirement of alleging the violation of a clearly
established constitutional right.184
E. Qualified Immunity: A Compromise Between Countervailing
Concerns
Government officials facing personal liability for objectively
discernable constitutional violations committed in the course of performing
discretionary functions of their office are entitled to assert an affirmative
defense of qualified immunity,185 or, as the Supreme Court now prefers to
call it, immunity from suit. 186 In cases where the defense applies, a
plaintiff‘s claim may only be legally cognizable if it alleges personal
involvement on the part of the government official.187 The Supreme Court
has found that judicial inquiry is appropriate, therefore, when a plaintiff‘s
complaint makes a ―substantial showing‖ that a specific government
official was responsible for wielding governmental authority to impinge on
that plaintiff‘s private, constitutional rights.188 Until Iqbal‘s case reached
183. Id. (―[I]t is no answer to say that the plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to engage in
discovery. The substantive defense of immunity controls.‖).
184. Id. at 231 (majority opinion).
185. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (―[T]his Court has never indicated
that qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff‘s cause of action; instead we
have described it as a defense available to the official in question.‖). For an explanation of the
qualified immunity defense, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982), which held
that government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded by immunity so long as
they have not ―violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.‖ Harlow discarded the subjective element required for
qualified immunity under Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), which had refused to
immunize school officials who committed unlawful acts with the subjective intent to do so. Id. at
322. In Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998), the Court clarified that under the Harlow
standard, a qualified immunity defense could not be rebutted by evidence that the government
official‘s conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated, because evidence related to
the officer‘s subjective intent is ―simply irrelevant to that defense.‖ Id. at 587–88; see also
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (establishing that qualified immunity is assessed under a standard of
objective reasonableness).
186. The Court first began referring to qualified immunity as ―immunity from suit,‖ rather than
as a ―mere defense to liability,‖ in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). For a list of
―thoughtful‖ scholarly articles on qualified immunity, see Alan K. Chen, The Facts About
Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 235 n.29 (2006).
187. Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining
that the determination whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity is a purely
legal question); see also Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640 (asserting that because qualified immunity is a
defense, ―the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant‖).
188. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 398 (1932).
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the Supreme Court, personal involvement of a supervisory official could be
established in the Second Circuit189 if the official (1) directly participated
in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) failed to remedy a wrong after
learning of it through a report or appeal, (3) created or allowed an
unconstitutional policy or custom, (4) was grossly negligent in supervising
subordinates who actually committed the wrongful acts, or (5) failed to act
on information regarding an unconstitutional act when such failure
displayed a deliberate indifference to the rights of others.190 The Second
Circuit had further clarified that personal involvement did not necessitate a
government official‘s direct participation in a constitutional violation.191
In Saucier v. Katz,192 the Court developed a sequential two-part test
for determining whether an individual government officer is entitled to
qualified immunity in a Section 1983 or Bivens action. 193 First, a court
must ascertain whether the pleaded facts sufficiently allege the violation of
a constitutional right.194 If so, then the court must determine whether that
right was ―clearly established‖ at the time of the defendant‘s alleged
wrongdoing.195 Recently, the Court receded from the required order of the
test, holding that courts may still follow the Saucier sequence, but now
have the discretion to deviate from it in cases where to do so would be more
efficient or where judicial restraint calls for avoiding a constitutional
question that can be resolved on alternate grounds.196
Despite the frequency with which the immunity defense is evoked,
Judge Wilson of the Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged that ―[w]ading
through the doctrine of qualified immunity is one of the most morally and
conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate court judges routinely
face.‖ 197 Underlying the qualified immunity doctrine is the implicit
assumption that not only are government officials capable of error, but the
possibility of injury resulting from such error is outweighed by the
possibility that fear of liability could lead government officials not to act at
all. 198 In Pearson, the Court noted that the ―driving force‖ behind the
189. Iqbal‘s case fell under the Second Circuit‘s jurisdiction. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143
(2d Cir. 2007).
190. Johnson, 239 F.3d at 254.
191. Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 855 F.2d 1060, 1066 (2d Cir. 1989).
192. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
193. Id. at 200–01.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (―[W]hile the sequence set forth [in
Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.‖).
197. Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the
Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000).
198. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974).

94

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 69:69

creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was the goal of ensuring that
unmeritorious claims against government officials would be resolved before
the case reached discovery, thereby preventing the official from being
distracted from official duties and decreasing significant exertions of time
and expense during the pre-trial process. 199 The reason for treating
immunity as a threshold issue, therefore, is not only to spare government
defendants from unwarranted liability, but also to shield them from the
―unwarranted demands‖ of a traditional and prolonged lawsuit. 200 In
Crawford-El v. Britton, the Court acknowledged that the usual concerns
about social costs associated with subjecting public officials to discovery
and trial are especially acute in the context of claims that turn on improper
intent.201
Even so, as Justice Powell explained in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, ―[t]he
resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the
evils inevitable in any available alternative.‖202 Therefore, the Court has
often asserted that limited discovery is sometimes necessary before a
district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment regarding
qualified immunity.203 In the case of a government official who has abused
his or her official office, though, imposition of liability may afford the only
realistic means of vindicating the aggrieved party‘s constitutional rights.204
Moreover, the threat of such abuse is even more acute with respect to highlevel officials, whose greater power increases the potential for both
individual abuse of office and ―a regime of lawless conduct.‖205
III. THE COURT‘S REASONING
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 206 the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit, remanded the case, 207 and

199. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987)).
200. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
201. 523 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1998) (―Because an official‘s state of mind is ‗easy to allege and
hard to disprove,‘ insubstantial claims that turn on improper intent may be less amenable to
summary disposition than other types of claims against government officials.‖).
202. 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982).
203. See, e.g., id. at 820–21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing with the substantive standard
for qualified immunity set forth by the majority but suggesting also that ―it seems inescapable . . .
that some measure of discovery may sometimes be required to determine exactly what a publicofficial defendant did ‗know‘ at the time of his actions‖); see also Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593
n.14 (acknowledging that the Court has ―recognized that limited discovery may sometimes be
necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity‖).
204. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (majority opinion).
205. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505–06 (1978).
206. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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held that respondent Iqbal failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to
withstand petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller‘s pre-discovery motion to
dismiss the complaint‘s First and Fifth Amendment claims of unlawful
discrimination. 208 In so holding, the Court concluded first that because
there is no vicarious liability in Section 1983 and Bivens actions,209 such
that each defendant may only be held liable for his own unlawful acts,210 a
plaintiff seeking to impose supervisory liability on a government official for
racial discrimination must plead and prove that the official acted with a
discriminatory purpose. 211 Second, the Court extended the plausibility
standard governing the relationship between Rule 8 pleading requirements
and Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss that was announced in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly212 to all civil actions.213 Because the factual assertions
in Iqbal‘s complaint did not give rise to a plausible inference of petitioners‘
discriminatory states of mind, the Court held that his allegations against
Ashcroft and Mueller failed to satisfy the applicable standard under
Twombly.214
Writing for a majority of five,215 Justice Kennedy circumscribed the
two questions presented by the petitioners into a single, broad issue:
Whether Iqbal had pled sufficient facts to state a claim that petitioners had
violated his clearly established constitutional rights. 216 The Court first
discussed the legal doctrines for the underlying substantive claims, then
addressed the proper pleading standard under Twombly and Rule 8, finally
applying that standard to Iqbal‘s complaint.217
207. The Supreme Court instructed the court of appeals to decide whether to remand the case
to the district court regarding whether Iqbal should be granted leave to amend his complaint. Id.
at 1954.
208. Id. Although the original action named more than thirty defendants, the only two
defendants who petitioned for certiorari were John Ashcroft, the former U.S. Attorney General,
and Robert Mueller, then-Director of the FBI. Id. at 1942.
209. Id. at 1948. A Bivens action is the federal equivalent of a § 1983 action against state
officials. Id.
210. Id. at 1949.
211. Id. at 1948.
212. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
213. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
214. Id. at 1952 (citing and construing FED. R. CIV. P. 8).
215. Id. at 1941 (including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito).
216. Id. at 1942–43. Opening the opinion with a brief overview of the historical context giving
rise to Iqbal‘s grievances, Justice Kennedy explained that the Department of Justice launched a
vast investigation of suspected terrorists in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
attacks. Id. at 1943. He next clarified that Iqbal‘s constitutional challenge centered on the
conditions of his confinement rather than on the confinement itself or on his arrest. Id. at 1943–
44. Because only Ashcroft and Mueller had sought Supreme Court review, the only relevant
allegations were those against the executive level officials. Id. at 1944.
217. Id. at 1947–51.
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In determining the elements of the underlying legal claims, the Court
first considered the level of intent required for an unconstitutional
discrimination claim against government officials asserting a qualified
immunity defense.218 Because the alleged conduct giving rise to Iqbal‘s
claims was primarily that of lower-level federal employees and because
petitioners were two high-level government officials, the Court framed its
brief discussion of intent in terms of supervisory liability. 219 Neither
respondeat superior nor vicarious liability, Justice Kennedy concluded, are
applicable in Bivens actions, 220 so a plaintiff must plead that each
supervisory official has directly violated the Constitution through his or her
own individual actions. 221 For First and Fifth Amendment Bivens
violations alleging discrimination on the part of a supervisor, ―individual
action‖ requires discriminatory purpose.222
In designating purpose as the proper level of intent, the Court rejected
Iqbal‘s argument that liability should attach when a supervisor with
knowledge of a subordinate‘s purposively discriminatory conduct has
acquiesced in or condoned that conduct. 223 Because Bivens liability for
unconstitutional discrimination requires discriminatory purpose on the part
of a subordinate, the Court reasoned, the same standard of intent should
also be required of supervisors. 224 Therefore, supervisory liability is
actually a ―misnomer‖ in Bivens cases.225
Before considering whether Iqbal had sufficiently alleged that
Ashcroft and Mueller acted with discriminatory purpose, the Court first
reiterated and extended its holding in Twombly to conclude that for all civil
actions, only complaints that are facially plausible will survive a motion to
dismiss. 226 Facial plausibility exists, the Court explained, when a
complaint contains ―sufficient factual matter, accepted as true‖ to enable
the court ―to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.‖ 227 Justice Kennedy noted that although the
Court‘s conception of plausibility does not reach the level of probability, it
does envision ―more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
218. Id. at 1948.
219. Id. at 1948–49.
220. Id. at 1948 (assuming without deciding that Iqbal‘s First Amendment claim was
actionable under Bivens, the federal equivalent of a § 1983 suit against state officials).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1949.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1949, 1953.
227. Id. at 1949.
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unlawfully.‖ 228 In other words, plausibility demands factual allegations
that are more than ―‗merely consistent with‘‖ a defendant‘s liability.229
The standard in Twombly, the Court reasoned, was based on two
working principles: First, whereas all factual allegations in a complaint
must be accepted by the court as true, legal conclusions are entitled to no
such presumption; second, a complaint must state a plausible claim for
relief to survive dismissal. 230 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy proposed a
two-pronged approach for courts to employ in assessing a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss: (1) identify those allegations in a complaint that are not factual
and therefore not entitled to a presumption of truth, and (2) consider
whether the remaining allegations, taken as true, state a plausible claim.231
This assessment, the Court acknowledged, is ―a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.‖232
Applying the two-step Twombly approach to Iqbal‘s complaint, the
Court first identified three ―bare assertions‖ that, while not ―unrealistic or
nonsensical,‖ were so ―conclusory‖ that the Court could not presume them
to be true. 233 Turning to the remaining allegations, 234 Justice Kennedy
then applied the test‘s second prong to conclude that a more likely
explanation for Iqbal‘s classification as ―of high interest‖ was a legitimate
post-September 11th policy intended to arrest and detain illegal aliens with
suspected links to the terrorist attacks.235 Because the hijackers were Arab
Muslims, Justice Kennedy reasoned, it ―should come as no surprise‖ that
the policy resulted in a ―disparate, incidental impact‖ on individuals of such
race, religion, and national origin. 236 Given this ―‗obvious alternative
228. Id.
229. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 554, 557 (2007)).
230. Id. at 1949–50.
231. Id. at 1950.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1951. Specifically, Justice Kennedy construed the following assertions as too
conclusory: (1) that Ashcroft and Mueller ―knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject‖ Iqbal to egregious conditions of confinement at the ADMAX SHU ―as a matter
of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest,‖ (2) that Ashcroft was ―the principal architect‖ of the discriminatory policy,
and (3) that Mueller was ―instrumental‖ in accepting and implementing it. Id.
234. Although the complaint set forth 270 individual claims, the Court noted only two in its
plausibility assessment. First, that in the months after September 11, 2001, the FBI, ―under the
direction of Defendant Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part
of its investigation of the events of September 11.‖ Id. Second, that ―[t]he policy of holding postSeptember-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‗cleared‘
by the FBI was approved by Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks after
September 11, 2001.‖ Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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explanation,‘‖237 the Court determined that it was not plausible to conclude
that Iqbal‘s arrest was a result of purposeful discrimination.238
Moreover, even if such an inference were plausible as to Iqbal‘s
arrest, the allegations did not lead to the plausible inference that his
classification as ―of high interest‖ was based on a policy that categorized
post-September 11th detainees based on their race, religion, or national
origin. 239 Reasoning that Iqbal‘s allegations failed to ―show, or even
intimate‖ that Ashcroft and Mueller had detained Iqbal and others in the
ADMAX SHU with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, religion,
or national origin, the Court noted that the complaint merely suggested that
Ashcroft and Mueller had adopted and approved a policy of holding postSeptember 11th detainees in restrictive conditions.240 This policy, Justice
Kennedy concluded, could only lead to the plausible inference that the
high-level officials had responded to ―a devastating terrorist attack‖ by
seeking to keep individuals who were detained because of a suspected link
to the attack in the most secure conditions possible. 241 Without more
specific facts indicating petitioners‘ intent, Iqbal‘s allegation of purposeful
discrimination did not state a claim that entitled him to relief.242
Addressing in conclusion three of Iqbal‘s arguments, the Court made
clear that (1) Twombly‘s plausibility standard applies broadly to ―‗all civil
actions,‘‖ 243 (2) the ―careful-case-management approach‖ to controlling
discovery could not save an implausible complaint from dismissal,244 and
(3) bare assertions ―affix[ed with] the label ‗general allegation‘‖ are the
very type of conclusory claims that, without further factual enhancement,
are inherently unable to support a plausible inference of liability.245
Joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Souter
dissented from the Court‘s opinion, reasoning that it unnecessarily
eradicated supervisory liability under Bivens and misapplied the correct
pleading standard announced in Twombly to mistakenly hold that Iqbal‘s

237. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).
238. Id. at 1951–52.
239. Id. at 1952.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
244. Id. at 1953–54 (noting that rejecting a less ―relax[ed]‖ pleading standard despite
discovery controls is ―especially important‖ in the context of cases against government officials
entitled to a qualified immunity defense).
245. Id. at 1954 (rejecting Iqbal‘s contention that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 ―expressly
allow[s]‖ for a general assertion of discriminatory intent, because ―‗generally‘ is a relative term‖
whose specific meaning in the context of Rule 9 is inapplicable here).
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complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 8(a)(2).246 First, Justice Souter
recited a number of assertions contained in Iqbal‘s complaint, including
allegations against defendants not before the Court. 247 He then parsed
through the two questions contained in Ashcroft and Mueller‘s petition for
certiorari, explaining that while both questions assumed that supervisory
liability claims are actionable under Bivens, neither asked the Court to
assess the elements of such a claim. 248 Because the standard for
supervisory liability was not only undisputed, but specifically agreed upon
by the parties,249 Justice Souter reasoned that the Court erred in ruling on
the substantive standard sua sponte.250 The Court‘s ruling, Justice Souter
contended, was ―especially inappropriate‖ in this case because such a ruling
was, even according to the Court‘s own analysis, unnecessary to decide the
questions presented.251 Noting that ―a spectrum of possible tests‖ exists for
supervisory liability, Justice Souter argued that the majority‘s assumption
that such liability could exist only under a theory of respondeat superior or
not at all was a false dichotomy that exemplified the danger of issuing farreaching decisions without briefing, argument, or any real depth of
analysis.252
Second, Justice Souter clarified that his analysis of Iqbal‘s complaint
differed from the majority‘s not because he disagreed that Twombly‘s
plausibility standard should apply or because he took issue with that

246. Id. at 1954–55 (Souter, J., dissenting). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading for relief
contain ―a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.‖
FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
247. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955.
248. Id. at 1955–56. The two questions were as follows: (1) ―Whether a conclusory allegation
that a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a
plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts purportedly committed by subordinate officials is
sufficient to state individual-capacity claims against those officials under Bivens‖; and (2)
―Whether a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official may be held personally liable for
the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level
supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such
subordinate officials.‖ Id.
249. Ashcroft and Mueller conceded that knowledge of their subordinate‘s unconstitutional
acts coupled with their own ―deliberate[] indifferen[ce]‖ to those acts could subject them to
supervisory liability under Bivens. Id. at 1956.
250. Id. at 1956–57.
251. Id. at 1957. Justice Souter explained that because the Court construed the allegation that
Ashcroft and Mueller ―authorized, condoned, or even were aware of their subordinates‘
discriminatory conduct‖ as both conclusory and not entitled to the presumption of truth, the
complaint would have been dismissed as implausible regardless of the liability standard. Id. at
1958. In addition, Justice Souter opined that because the Court ruled on the supervisory liability
issue without receiving any briefing or argument from the parties, ―[t]he attendant risk of error
[was] palpable.‖ Id. at 1957. Finally, Justice Souter declared that the ruling was ―most unfair to
Iqbal,‖ who ―was entitled to rely on [petitioners‘] concessions.‖ Id.
252. Id. at 1958.
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standard,253 but rather because he disagreed with the majority‘s application
of it.254
Specifically, he rejected the Court‘s contention that three particular
allegations were too conclusory to be taken as true and offered a more
contextualized, less stringent identification of the complaint‘s factual
allegations.255 Agreeing that dismissal would have been proper if the only
allegations in Iqbal‘s complaint entitled to a presumption of veracity were
the two selected by the majority, Justice Souter went on to assert that ―these
allegations do not stand alone as the only significant, nonconclusory
statements.‖256 His disagreement with the majority‘s approach, therefore,
was based on what he considered to be an improper interpretive approach of
analyzing Iqbal‘s assertions in isolation, thereby disregarding certain
―subsidiary allegations‖ that could have pushed those allegations
disregarded by the Court as too conclusory into what Justice Souter
considered factual assertions. 257 Implicitly rejecting the Court‘s twopronged approach to assessing plausibility, Justice Souter conversely
endorsed a method of interpretation under which courts should consider the
complaint ―as a whole.‖ 258 Under this approach, given petitioners‘
concession that knowledge and acquiescence could sufficiently support a
supervisory liability claim, Iqbal‘s complaint was sufficiently plausible.259
Justice Breyer wrote his own brief dissent to endorse the adequacy of
careful discovery management and ―other legal weapons‖ that courts could
use to prevent unwarranted litigation against government officials asserting
a qualified immunity defense. 260 Although he joined Justice Souter‘s
dissent—which approved of the Court‘s understanding of Twombly‘s
plausibility standard—Justice Breyer did not agree that the need to prevent

253. Justice Souter actually announced this standard for the Court in Twombly. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
254. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959.
255. Id. at 1959–60 (arguing that the allegation that Ashcroft was a ―principal architect‖ of the
allegedly discriminatory policy and the claim that he and Mueller ―knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to [the harsh] conditions of confinement as a
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
legitimate penological interest‖ were factual, rather than conclusory); see supra note 233 and
accompanying text (listing the three allegations identified as too conclusory by Justice Kennedy‘s
majority opinion).
256. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960.
257. Id. at 1960–61 (noting also that ―the majority‘s holding that the statements it selects are
conclusory cannot be squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as
nonconclusory‖).
258. Id. at 1961.
259. Id. at 1958–59.
260. Id. at 1961–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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harmful discovery or litigation against government officials adequately
justified the Court‘s interpretation of Twombly and Rule 8.261
IV. ANALYSIS
Although Ashcroft v. Iqbal seemed to do little more than extend Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly‘s262 plausibility standard to all civil actions, its
implications for pleading practice, court access, and the judicial role run
much deeper. In moving further from Conley v. Gibson‘s263 pro-plaintiff
standard, the Court not only endorsed but seemingly encouraged an
unprecedented level of judicial discretion in the lower courts with respect to
pre-discovery motions to dismiss.264 This all but ensures a non-uniform,
arbitrary procedural landscape across which certain defendants will no
longer gain meaningful access to the federal courts.265 In departing from
longstanding deference to the formal rulemaking process, the Court
anticipated the same threat of judicial activism that the plausibility standard
is likely to exacerbate.266 The standard itself is problematic insofar as it
has raised the pleading bar, thereby departing from the vision of the drafters
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—to encourage resolution of cases
on the merits. 267 Moreover, it represents the quintessential procedural
solution to a substantive dilemma. 268 The Court not only indirectly
attacked the growing problem of outrageous discovery costs, but also
granted de facto immunity to high-level government officials, thereby
absolving them from culpability on the basis of a pleading standard that is
patently unjust for plaintiffs incapable of pleading ―non-conclusory‖ facts
before discovery.269
A. The Problem with Plausibility: Iqbal Shifted the Analysis for
12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss from a Relatively Bright-Line Test to
an Open Market on Judicial Subjectivity
Although Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly270 had created considerable
confusion in the lower federal courts,271 the Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal272
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 1961.
500 U.S. 554 (2007).
355 U.S. 541 (1957).
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).

102

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 69:69

did little to clarify the meaning of plausibility or suggest how judges might
distinguish plausible inferences of liability from those that are probable,
possible, or conceivable.273 Revealing only that the new standard applies
to all civil actions, the Court limited its advice to a single, curious
suggestion: Discerning plausibility is ―a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.‖ 274 As a result, the Court all but ensured that the contentious
response to Twombly reflects merely the beginning of the difficulties that
federal courts will continue to face as they develop understandings—and
applications—of the flexible, discretionary directive that is plausibility.275
Moreover, as one federal district judge has suggested, this evolution in the
lower courts—an ―inherently subjective endeavor‖—will inevitably
produce varied results, such as those regarding the quantum of facts
required for a sufficient complaint.276
The Court‘s explicit invitation of judicial discretion is problematic on
the Court‘s own terms: Just as ―Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . .
dismissals based on a judge‘s disbelief of a complaint‘s factual
allegations,‖277 nor should Rule 8 encourage dismissals based on a judge‘s
subjective disbelief that particular factual allegations could plausibly

271. See Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower
Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 858 (2008)
(suggesting that Twombly provided so little guidance that it threw the lower federal courts into
―disarray‖ and led to ―every conceivable answer‖ regarding how broadly the decision should be
applied). See generally Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 876–77 (2009) (arguing that Twombly was a court access decision
rather than a procedural decision, and suggesting that Twombly did not ―alter pleading rules in as
drastic a way as many of its critics, and even some of its few defenders, suppose‖); Douglas G.
Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1088 (2009) (defending the plausibility
standard as one with ―fairly clear guidelines‖); Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will
We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 893, 894 n.7 (2008) (listing scholarly
articles discussing pleading standards after Twombly).
272. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
273. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (―The issues raised
by Twombly are not easily resolved, and likely will be a source of controversy for years to
come.‖).
274. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
275. Compare McMahon, supra note 271, at 863–64 (pointing out the impossibility of a
consistent approach to interpreting and applying ―plausibility‖ in the district courts), with Smith,
supra note 271, at 1088–89 (arguing that a careful reading of Twombly ―provides fairly clear
guidelines for courts assessing whether a complaint meets the requirements of Rule 8‖).
276. McMahon, supra note 271, at 869 (arguing that ―[t]he standard for pleading a claim must
be clear, and it must be the same for everyone‖); see also Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could
Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10 (quoting Professor
Stephen B. Burbank as saying that Iqbal ―‗is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases
they disfavor‘‖).
277. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
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establish liability. 278 When the Federal Rules were originally enacted,
Judge Clark explained that a court‘s ability to dismiss a pleading summarily
was confined to ―the clearest of cases.‖279 Conspicuously departing from
and complicating that dictate by adding a subjective dimension to the
analysis, the Court endorsed a standard that is not only incapable of
uniformity, but that rejects, sub silentio, the careful vision of the Rules‘
drafters.280
Comments from a number of Justices at the Iqbal oral argument
underscore the difficulty of achieving consistency in the application of a
discretionary standard. Justice Souter admitted, for instance, that he found
significant tension in Iqbal‘s allegations, 281 while Justice Scalia easily
reduced the gist of the complaint to two basic possibilities: (1) a valid and
lawful post-September 11th policy, or (2) the ―much less plausible‖
possibility that Ashcroft and Mueller personally directed unconstitutional
and unlawful acts.282 Eclipsing plausibility entirely, Justice Scalia went so
far as to pronounce the complaint‘s allegation that Iqbal and others
similarly situated were detained solely because of their race, religion, and
national origin ―impossible.‖283 Writ large in this assertion is the troubling
insinuation that no amount of factual allegations could have satisfied Justice
Scalia‘s version of plausibility given the particular factual context of Iqbal‘s
claims. For him, the very premise of those claims—that high-level
government officials were even capable of participating in a discriminatory
policy—is simply not possible.284
278. Cf. Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A “Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 827, 830 (2008)
(noting that while offering little guidance to lower courts and plaintiffs with respect to the precise
meaning of plausibility, Twombly ―reflects a significant shift away from the litigation-promoting
mindset embodied in Conley and instead solidifies what has been a growing hostility toward
litigation‖).
279. Clark, supra note 77, at 465 (citing Worthington & Co. v. Belton, 18 T.L.R. 438 (Eng.
C.A. 1902)). Judge Clark also asserted that cases warranting such dismissal ―are the great
exceptions, not the rule.‖ Id. at 472.
280. See, e.g., id. at 467 (asserting the desirability of ―a system of procedure which will
substantially eliminate motion practice dealing with pleading forms and force adjudication upon
the merits, either by way of summary judgment or trial‖).
281. Transcript of Oral Argument at *9, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2008) (No. 071015), 2008 WL 5168391.
282. Id. at *32–33. Also noteworthy is the way in which Justice Scalia framed the two
alternatives, using the term ―policy‖ only for the possibility that was, for him, obviously more
plausible. The textualist‘s language belies that Ashcroft and Mueller‘s culpability is so far from
the realm of possibility for Justice Scalia that he cannot even bring himself to use the same
language to describe it.
283. Id. at *54–55.
284. Also concerning is Justice Scalia‘s obfuscation of the long-standing principle that
―[s]tandards of pleadings are not the same as standards of proof.‖ Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 246 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Dissenting in Twombly, Justice Stevens suggested that the Court‘s
decision in that case was driven by a ―transparent policy concern‖—
protecting antitrust defendants.285 The decision in Iqbal is susceptible to
the same criticism of a subjective judicial agenda.286 More disquieting than
the way Supreme Court Justices deploy their personal understandings of
abstract terms like ―plausible‖ in specific cases, though, are the broader
institutional consequences that may follow from the Court‘s approbation
and infliction of this method of procedural adjudication on the systemic
level.287
Like those of his colleagues, Justice Alito‘s remarks at oral argument
also highlight, somewhat ironically, just how problematic a discretionary
standard can be. Rejecting the notion that a district court judge could use
his or her discretion to limit and structure discovery to adequately protect
high-level government officials who fail to attain dismissal on qualified
immunity grounds, Justice Alito asked, ―How many district judges are there
in the country? Over 600. One of the district judges has a very aggressive
idea about what the discovery should be. What‘s the protection there?‖288
The Justice‘s question could just as easily refer to the lack of protection
plaintiffs‘ complaints will receive under a plausibility standard. 289 In
implying that high-level government officials who have tried—and failed—
to obtain qualified immunity at the 12(b)(6) stage should nonetheless be
shielded from discovery, Justice Alito ironically undermined the very

285. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 596 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. McMahon, supra note 271, at 863–64 (calling plausibility assessments ―inherently
subjective‖).
287. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 535 (1947) (―[T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication and
legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained,
reluctance to do so.‖). This criticism is applicable to Iqbal on two different levels. First, the
Court itself employed a subjective policy judgment unmoored to precedent (other than Twombly
and its nascent progeny) in determining that the best way to resolve the case and controversy
before it was to amend, rather than apply, Rule 8. Second, in so amending, the Court opened the
door to potentially limitless judicial subjectivity from the lower federal courts, which must use
their ―judicial experience and common sense‖ in determining whether civil complaints subject to
12(b)(6) motions are plausible enough to withstand dismissal. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
288. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *48.
289. For a particularly germane example of the possible divergence in federal appellate judges‘
understanding of plausibility, compare al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009)
(―Drawing on our ‗judicial experience and common sense,‘ as the Supreme Court urges us to do,
we find that al-Kidd has met his burden of pleading a claim for relief that is plausible . . . .‖), with
id. at 992–94 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing, on the grounds of
Twombly and Iqbal, that ―[i]t may be conceivable to al-Kidd that Ashcroft encouraged his
subordinates to flout the requirements of § 3144, but al-Kidd‘s allegations have not ‗nudged [his]
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible‘‖).
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premise supporting the plausibility standard he later voted for—faith in
judicial discretion.290
Just as a plausibility standard raises serious concerns about the judicial
role, it also raises serious concerns about a judicially-driven (d)evolution of
the law of federal civil procedure; rather than moving the law forward,
Twombly and Iqbal signal a return to the fact-based pleading system that
has already been rejected as historically unjust and effectively
unworkable.291 Though the Court in Iqbal paid lip-service to the long-dead
days of fact pleading under the Codes, its language in asserting the
inadequacy of facts ―merely consistent with‖ the defendant‘s liability
masked a covert mandate of increased factual specificity. 292 The
imposition of such a mandate suggests that the Court clearly ignored the
fact that plaintiffs in 2009 are in no better a position to distinguish between
facts and conclusions than were plaintiffs in 1959.293
Moreover, the Court‘s insistence on a bright line between facts and
legal conclusions294 raises the question whether Iqbal signifies a departure
from the Court‘s long-standing position that ―ordinary pleading rules are
not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.‖295 Plaintiffs relying
on Form 9 in the appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,296 for
instance, will no longer receive meaningful assistance from a template that
290. A certain level of discretion, it is worth noting, has always been part of a court‘s
assessment under the qualified immunity doctrine. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507
(1978) (―Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities
of artful pleading.‖).
291. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 271, at 867 (noting that the drafters of Rule 8 specifically
rejected a conception of the Rule that would require pleading facts).
292. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (affirming that ―Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure
from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions‖).
293. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1218, at 265 (asserting the practical
impossibility of distinguishing between ―ultimate facts,‖ which were required, and ―evidence‖ and
―conclusions of law,‖ which were improper, and explaining that the three categories ―tended to
merge to form a continuum‖ with ―no readily apparent dividing markers‖); Weinstein & Distler,
supra note 115, at 520–21 (―[I]t is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among ‗ultimate
facts,‘ ‗evidence,‘ and ‗conclusions.‘‖).
294. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (―[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.‖).
295. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (conceding that ―ordinary
pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff‖ and suggesting that ―it
should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a
defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in
mind‖ (emphasis added)). After Iqbal, this burden of giving defendant ―some indication‖ of loss
and cause has effectually evolved into the burden of giving enough facts to convince the particular
judge hearing the case that liability is plausible.
296. Form 9 in the appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a sample complaint
form for a simple negligence action. FED. R. CIV. P. app., Form 9.
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provides defendants being sued for negligence with what can only be
construed under the plausibility standard as a bare, conclusory allegation
that ―defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was
then crossing [the] highway.‖297 Another way of framing this inequity for
plaintiffs is in terms of ―information asymmetry.‖ 298 Such asymmetry
occurs when, paradoxically, plaintiffs with bona fide grievances are at once
unable to include sufficient facts in an original complaint without first
investigating the source of those facts through discovery and also blocked
from discovery because of their inability to plead the very facts that only
discovery can yield.299
B. Amending Rule 8 by Judicial Fiat: Purporting Simply to Extend
Twombly’s Plausibility Standard, the Court Actually Effectuated
More Significant Changes in Federal Procedure Jurisprudence
That the Court has often declined to amend the Federal Rules from the
bench reflects distaste for judicial activism in the context of establishing
and re-writing procedural rules.300 Justice Kennedy‘s reluctance to revise

297. Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV.
IN
BRIEF
135,
141
(2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s
=inbrief&p=2007/07/09/dodson. The possible inutility of the forms after Twombly and Iqbal
represents a significant departure from Conley‘s assertion that the ―illustrative forms appended to
the Rules‖ demonstrate that a complaint need only give the defendant fair notice of the claim and
its grounds. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). It also undermines Judge Clark‘s vision
that the relatively un-detailed information contained in Form 9 clearly ―affords adequate basis for
res judicata,‖ Clark, supra note 77, at 461–62, in seeking to accomplish the twin goals of
differentiating the plaintiff‘s case from all others and giving the defendant notice of the general
type of claims being advanced, id. at 456–57.
298. Dodson, supra note 297, at 138–39 & n.18 (borrowing the term ―information asymmetry‖
from Professor Randy Picker and calling the plausibility standard ―notice-plus‖).
299. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) (―The existence of a subjective belief
will frequently turn on factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to know.‖);
Dodson, supra note 297, at 138–39 (arguing that plaintiffs will have difficulty alleging sufficient
facts with respect to claims where information is not in their control, such as in antitrust cases);
McMahon, supra note 271, at 867 & n.114 (making the same argument and offering the example
of employment discrimination claims); cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590–91 (1998)
(explaining that one reason Harlow abrogated the subjective element required for a qualified
immunity defense is because ―focusing on ‗the objective legal reasonableness of an official‘s
acts‘ . . . avoids the unfairness of imposing liability on a defendant who ‗could not reasonably be
expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments‘‖ (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818–19 (1982))); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 245–46 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the court of appeals‘s ―heightened pleading standard‖ and reasoning that because
―evidence of [malice] is peculiarly within the control of the defendant,‖ the standard ―effectively
precludes any Bivens action in which the defendant‘s state of mind is an element of the underlying
claim‖).
300. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965) (suggesting that ―‗the administration of
legal proceedings‘‖ is ―‗an area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent
power, completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules‘‖ (quoting
Lumbermen‘s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963))). But see Tellabs, Inc.
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pleading standards by judicial fiat in Crawford-El v. Britton,301 therefore,
was more likely a function of disdain for judicial intervention in the
procedural arena than uncertainty as to the substantive merits of an
amended standard. 302 Given his affirmative argument for a heightened
standard in Siegert v. Gilley,303 it is not surprising that Justice Kennedy was
willing to vote in favor of extending Twombly to all civil cases in Iqbal and
further to author the opinion himself—potential accusations of judicial
activism notwithstanding.304
Admittedly, Justice Kennedy‘s analyses in Siegert—a defamation case
in which the immunity issue was whether the plaintiff had demonstrated a
clearly established liberty interest—and Iqbal—in which the Court did not
address the immunity issue directly—necessarily differed. 305 Justice
Kennedy‘s proposal of a heightened pleading standard in Siegert signifies
that he strongly champions governmental immunity as a general matter and
is not opposed to some judicial intervention into the realm of procedure
where countervailing concerns, such as the need to protect high-level
officials from the intrusions of discovery, outweigh his reluctance to bypass
the formal rulemaking process.306 What significantly distinguishes Siegert
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 332 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(asserting that courts must interpret statutes according to their single most plausible meaning,
suggesting that ―[t]o describe this as an exercise of ‗delegated lawmaking authority‘ seems to me
peculiar—unless one believes in lawmakers who have no discretion,‖ and adding that ―[c]ourts
must apply judgment, to be sure[, b]ut judgment is not discretion‖).
301. 523 U.S. at 601 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
302. One reason the Court may disfavor amending procedural rules may be a recognition that
the Justices are ill-equipped to engage in such rulemaking, given their distance from the daily
realities of litigation. McMahon, supra note 271, at 869. Moreover, none of the Iqbal Justices
ever sat on a federal district bench, though Justice Souter was a state court trial judge. See id. at
869 & n.122 (suggesting that the Justices‘ lack of experience as trial lawyers or judges may be
responsible for ―problematic decisions like Twombly‖ and opining that Justice Souter‘s experience
as a trial judge makes his authorship of Twombly ―utterly mystifying‖). Nothing underscores the
Court‘s lack of familiarity with the minutiae of the Federal Rules more starkly than one of Justice
Breyer‘s comments at the Iqbal oral argument: ―I want to know where the judge has the power to
control discovery in the rules. That‘s—I should know that. I can‘t remember my civil procedure
course. Probably, it was taught on day 4.‖ Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *17.
303. 500 U.S. at 235–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra Part II.D.
304. See Liptak, supra note 276 (calling Iqbal ―[t]he most consequential decision of the
Supreme Court‘s last term,‖ assuming that the decision ―makes it much easier for judges to
dismiss civil lawsuits right after they are filed,‖ and suggesting that, after Iqbal, ―a lawsuit has to
satisfy a skeptical judicial gatekeeper‖ with accusations that ―ring true‖).
305. Compare Siegert, 500 U.S. at 235–36 (―The heightened pleading standard is a necessary
and appropriate accommodation between the state of mind component of malice and the objective
test that prevails in qualified immunity analysis as a general matter.‖), with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1953–54 (2009) (declining to ―relax the pleading requirements‖ in qualified
immunity cases such that limited discovery would be permitted under a ―careful-casemanagement approach‖).
306. Given the choice between a departure from established procedural standards and the
possibility of subjecting government officials to disruptive discovery absent immunity, Justice
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from Iqbal, moreover, are the stakes of the two cases. In the former, the
Court considered and dismissed a defamation claim by a clinical
psychologist employed by a federal government facility because the
psychologist‘s complaint had not sufficiently alleged a constitutional
violation.307 Iqbal, on the other hand, had potentially graver consequences,
not only with respect to public sentiment regarding the Bush
Administration‘s response to the September 11th attacks as a general
matter, but also because the case came dangerously close to implicating
men in the highest stations of federal government in the highest order of
constitutional violations. 308 Moreover, Justice Stevens‘s assertion in
Crawford-El that the Court has ―consistently declined . . . invitations to
revise established rules that are separate from the qualified immunity
defense,‖ 309 bolsters the likelihood that in Iqbal, the Court effectively
sutured the pleading issue to the immunity defense.310
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy made only four comments, all in
close succession and all about the same issue.311 Addressing petitioners‘
counsel, Justice Kennedy asked, ―If we were to say that Twombly is to be
confined to the antitrust and commercial context, would—would that
destroy your case?‖ 312 In framing the question in terms of outcome,
thereby linguistically subordinating legal doctrine to final disposition,
Justice Kennedy‘s question reveals—in retrospect at least—that he may
already have landed on what he believed to be the only plausible way to
resolve the case without either exposing the high-level government officials
to discovery or explicitly extending the qualified immunity doctrine.313 If
so, then follows the disturbing question whether the Court‘s most
significant player votes based on underlying substantive norms and

Kennedy has asserted that ―[t]he substantive defense of immunity controls.‖ Siegert, 500 U.S. at
236.
307. Id. at 227, 233–34 (majority opinion) (concluding that, under Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
708–09 (1976), damage to reputation is not a liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment and is not recoverable in a Bivens cause of action).
308. Because the standards for supervisory liability were unclear, however, Iqbal would not
necessarily have been able to prove a clearly established constitutional violation even if his
complaint had withstood dismissal. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948–49 (asserting that supervisory
liability is a ―misnomer‖ and that because ―purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose
Bivens liability on [a] subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination,‖ the same standard applies
to ―an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities‖).
309. 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (emphasis added).
310. See infra Part IV.C.
311. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *22–23.
312. Id.
313. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235–36 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (reasoning that although a ―heightened pleading standard‖ represents a departure from
usual pleading requirements, ―[t]he substantive defense of immunity controls‖).
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ideology. 314 If not, it is unclear what else might account for Justice
Kennedy‘s inconsistency in evoking the principle against judicial
legislation in Crawford-El on one hand and conspicuously failing to do so
in Siegert and Iqbal on the other.315 Although it could have been possible
to resolve Iqbal on the basis of interlocutory jurisdiction, this would not
necessarily have shielded Ashcroft and Mueller from ongoing litigation in
the courts below.316 Therefore, Justice Kennedy extended Twombly to all
civil actions.317
In so doing, he exposed himself to the inevitable criticism of not only
having amended Rule 8 from the bench, but having done so in such a way
as to heighten the pleading standard. 318 According to the Court, a
―heightened pleading standard‖ is one ―more stringent than the usual

314. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A1
(asserting that Chief Justice Roberts is orchestrating an incremental shift to the right, that Justice
Kennedy tends to vote with Chief Justice Roberts, that Justice Kennedy is the Court‘s swing vote
and the ―most powerful jurist in America,‖ and that the ―Constitution, it turns out, means what
Justice Kennedy says it means‖). If it is true that Justice Kennedy is drifting from his central
position further to the right, this may account for his willingness to join his more conservative
colleagues in using judicial activism qua rulemaking from the bench to expand governmental
immunity and other principles according to Chief Justice Roberts‘s agenda. Id.
315. Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York argues that federal judges have
consistently ignored the design of the Federal Rules—which were intended to facilitate a
smoother journey through confusing procedural obstacles, thereby encouraging courts to re-shift
the litigation emphasis to the merits of a case—by resorting to an emphasis on procedural
efficiency. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People:
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 107–08 (2008) [hereinafter
Weinstein, Role of Judges]. This is misguided, the Judge argues, not only because it has the effect
of closing the proverbial courthouse doors to ―the weak and the aggrieved,‖ thus threatening the
legitimacy of the judiciary, but also because it often leads to a denial of substantive rights absent
procedural safeguards. Id. at 107; see also Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1919–21
(1989) (stating that the anti-access movement is objectionable because plaintiffs‘ substantive
rights should not be denied through ―procedural subterfuge‖). What this means, according to
Judge Weinstein, is that the Court now so favors defendants, including the government, that the
current pleading standards have closed off access to the courts, thereby deviating from President
Lincoln‘s notion that government should exist ―for the people.‖ Weinstein, Role of Judges, supra,
at 112. The anti-access movement also ignores the Court‘s assertion that there is no immunity
from all discovery. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 n.14 (1998) (recognizing that
―limited discovery may sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity‖).
316. In the Iqbal majority opinion, Justice Kennedy first resolved the threshold jurisdictional
question before evaluating Iqbal‘s complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009).
He found that both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction
over petitioners‘ interlocutory appeal from the district court‘s rejection of qualified immunity at
the motion to dismiss stage. Id.
317. Id. at 1953.
318. E.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (―Post-Twombly, plaintiffs
face a higher burden of pleading facts, and courts face greater uncertainty in evaluating
complaints.‖).
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pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.‖319 In Twombly, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that it
was raising the pleading standard.320 In changing the scope of the Twombly
standard rather than its substance, Iqbal implicitly echoed this
contention. 321 Yet despite the Court‘s assertions to the contrary, both
courts and commentators have suggested that the two decisions have
imposed a more stringent pleading standard.322 More interesting than who
is correct on this point—which will only be revealed over time as the lower
federal courts apply the plausibility standard and the Twombly-Iqbal line
evolves 323 —is the issue of judicial legislation in the realm of civil
procedure and its implications for the judiciary, the Court, and the cases
that have inspired the question.324
C. A Procedural Solution to a Substantive Problem: To the Extent that
the Court in Iqbal “Fixed” Rule 8, It Was Not Because Rule 8 Itself
Needed Fixing
Javaid Iqbal did not likely file his complaint with an eye toward
making legal history regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
though he may have hoped that factual history would vindicate his
prolonged and depraved confinement without due process of law. What
Iqbal may not have anticipated was how two issues—the pleading standard
and the qualified immunity doctrine evoked in response to his allegations
against Ashcroft and Mueller—would come together in the perfect storm to
319. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
164 (1993).
320. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (―[W]e do not require
heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.‖); cf. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (evoking the statutory construction canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the express mention of one thing excludes all others—to
suggest that Rule 9(b)‘s factual particularity requirement for certain contexts implies that there is
no such requirement generally under Rule 8).
321. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (explaining that ―[o]ur decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for ‗all civil actions‘‖). Justice Kennedy did not explicitly address the question
whether Iqbal raised the pleading standard, assumedly because the Court did so in Twombly. To
address the issue again where doing so was not necessary would have drawn unwanted attention
to the also unacknowledged confusion in the lower courts over the meaning of plausibility.
322. See, e.g., Tice, supra note 278, at 827 (describing the Twombly standard as ―a broad
decision that appears to tighten the reins on pleading standards‖). For scholarly critiques of
Twombly by federal judges suggesting that plausibility is a heightened standard, see Weinstein,
Role of Judges, supra note 315, at 110–11, and McMahon, supra note at 271, at 863 (asserting
that the Supreme Court‘s contention in Twombly that it was not imposing a heightened pleading
standard was ―sheer sophistry,‖ but conceding that the Court had not intended to do away with
notice pleading entirely).
323. Cf. Dodson, supra note 297, at 142 (suggesting that it will take years of increased
litigation to determine what Twombly actually requires).
324. See infra Part IV.C.
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which his grievances were ultimately sacrificed. Petitioners‘ attorney,
General Garre, framed the case in the opening sentence of his oral argument
as one that ―concern[ed] the qualified immunity of high-ranking
government officials like the Attorney General of the United States and
Director of the FBI and supervisory liability claims under Bivens based on
the alleged wrongdoing of much lower level officials.‖ 325 Later in his
argument, General Garre reiterated that the case was primarily about
qualified immunity, even as he urged the Court to formally extend Twombly
beyond the antitrust context. 326 In so doing, the General conflated the
substantive issue of qualified immunity with the procedural issue of
whether Iqbal‘s complaint sufficiently stated a claim for relief, thereby
suggesting to the Court that one way—perhaps the only way—to ensure
immunity for his clients would require a procedural resolution of the
case.327
To bolster this invitation to the Court, General Garre made two claims
regarding the substantive standards of law germane to Iqbal‘s claims: First,
he argued that Iqbal must plead an affirmative link between petitioners and
the alleged wrongdoing of the lower-level officials, as required for
supervisory liability under Bivens; second, he asserted that Ashcroft was
―entitled to a presumption of regularity of his actions, so that—that
standard itself ought to affect how one views the complaint.‖328 None of
the Justices responded directly to this strange suggestion that a particular
type of defendant—the U.S. Attorney General and others similarly
situated—is somehow entitled to a ―standard‖ under which his actions are
presumed to be consistent,329 but the Court‘s opinion silently echoes the
sentiment.330

325. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *3.
326. Id. at *24.
327. General Garre argued:
[R]eally we‘re here talking about claims against the highest-level officials of our
government, who everyone agrees are entitled to the doctrine of qualified immunity, a
doctrine that was designed, at the end of the day, to protect the effective functioning of
our government. These officials are entitled at least to the protections that this Court
found appropriate for civil antitrust defendants.
Id. (emphasis added). For a critique of the relationship between qualified immunity and pleading
standards as articulated in petitioners‘ brief, see Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure & Fed.
Practice, supra note 121, at 28 (arguing that petitioners‘ argument ―tacitly moves from the
policies that animate qualified immunity to the standards of pleading‖ and criticizing the
argument‘s reliance on ―the abstraction of qualified immunity‖ as ―a free-floating concept that
permeates any case to which it might attach‖ such that ―the standards of pleading are virally
infected by the concept‖).
328. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *57–58 (emphasis added).
329. General Garre seems to be suggesting that high-level government officials are
automatically entitled to something like an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 404, which
prohibits the admission of ―[e]vidence of a person‘s character or a trait of character . . . for the
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In other words, although the Court never explicitly expressed a desire
to immunize high-level government officials from liability for actions
immediately following September 11th, the structure of Justice Kennedy‘s
opinion suggests that the majority had an implicit intention of doing so.331
First, after briefly outlining the case‘s question presented and stating the
Court‘s disposition, Justice Kennedy began the opinion in full by offering a
version of the relevant historical context unlike those that had appeared in
the opinions of the courts below, pointedly citing factual material from a
2003 Department of Justice study. 332 From the outset, then, the Court
signaled its intent to shroud the case in its own version of the aftermath of
September 11th. 333 That the Court did its own research is not in itself
surprising or problematic. But the fact that the Court cited research from
the government—hardly an impartial party in a case where potential
constitutional violations seriously implicated Bush Administration
policies—coupled with the Court‘s conspicuous omission of details
regarding Iqbal‘s individual allegations 334 suggests that Justice Kennedy

purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.‖ FED. R. EVID.
404(a).
330. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951–52 (2009) (arguing that Iqbal‘s allegation that
Ashcroft and Mueller had acted with discriminatory intent was not plausible, given the ―obvious
alternative explanation‖ that the arrests overseen by the high-level officials were lawful and
justified by the post-September 11th context); cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
573 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the insertion of plausibility into 12(b)(6) analysis
―seems to be driven by the majority‘s appraisal of the plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation
rather than its legal sufficiency‖).
331. Cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 612 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (proposing a
qualified immunity test for intent-based constitutional torts under which ―once the trial court finds
that the asserted grounds for the official action were objectively valid . . . it would not admit any
proof that something other than those reasonable grounds was the genuine motive‖ and conceding
that his proposal is ―of course a more severe restriction‖).
332. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943.
333. Id. (explaining that only one week after the attacks, ―the FBI had received more than
96,000 tips or potential leads from the public‖ (citing U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS
HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
SEPTEMBER
11
ATTACKS
1,
11–12
(2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf?bsci_scan_61073EC0F74759AD=0&bsci_scan_fi
lename=full.pdf)).
334. Downplaying the multitude of individual physical and mental abuses catalogued in the
complaint, Justice Kennedy noted only that, as ―one of the detainees,‖ Iqbal was arrested on
immigration charges, designated a person ―of high interest‖ to the September 11th investigations,
held at the ADMAX SHU where he was ―kept in lockdown 23 hours a day,‖ sentenced to a prison
term after pleading guilty to the criminal charges, and removed to Pakistan. Id. The Court‘s
introductory remarks reduced the constitutional violations alleged in Iqbal‘s twenty-one-cause-ofaction complaint to a single sentence:
For instance, the complaint alleges that respondent‘s jailors ―kicked him in the
stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across‖ his cell without
justification; subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no
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intended from the start to paint a picture of a legitimate and reasonable
executive response to an unprecedented affront to American values and way
of life.
Next, Justice Kennedy turned to procedural history, where he
selectively emphasized sections of the lower courts‘ opinions suggesting
that qualified immunity is of paramount importance in the post-September
11th context.335 He noted, for instance, Second Circuit Judge Cabranes‘s
―concern at the prospect of subjecting high-ranking Government officials—
entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity and charged with
responding to ‗a national and international security emergency
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic‘—to the burdens of
discovery.‖336 Echoing Judge Cabranes‘s dramatic language with respect
to this issue, Justice Kennedy declined to utilize the same rhetorical
flourishes in describing Iqbal‘s egregious conditions of confinement in the
ADMAX SHU. 337 Acknowledging the wantonness of these allegations
would have made it more difficult for the Court to explain why it accorded
favorable treatment to policymaking Executive Branch officials by reducing
their accountability through the judicial process.
The Court further bolstered its underlying norms about the behavior of
such officials in the opinion‘s legal analysis. For instance, Justice Kennedy
identified Iqbal‘s allegation that Ashcroft was the ―principal architect‖ of
the allegedly discriminatory policy as a ―bare assertion[]‖ not entitled to the
presumption of truth accorded to facts.338 He also identified, as a ―more
likely explanation[]‖ and ―obvious alternative‖ to Iqbal‘s theory that
animus-based discrimination drove the post-September 11th detention
policy, that Ashcroft‘s actions reflected legitimate security measures
necessary to deal with an unprecedented homeland attack.339 That Justice
Souter came to the opposite conclusion indicates the degree to which the
Court‘s ―experience and common sense‖ slid imperceptively into a certain

safety risk to himself or others; and refused to let him and other Muslims pray because
there would be ―[n]o prayers for terrorists.‖
Id. at 1943–44 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
335. Id. at 1944–45 (suggesting that the Court granted certiorari to resolve ―‗at the earliest
opportunity‘‖ how to immunize officials at the motion to dismiss stage).
336. Id. at 1945 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007)).
337. Id. at 1944. Given Justice Kennedy‘s concern with separating facts from legal
conclusions in assessing the plausibility of a complaint, his emphasis on dubiously factual postSeptember 11th events is stark. Ignoring the equivocality of history, Justice Kennedy artfully
spun his own version of the facts relevant to Iqbal‘s case—external facts—in such a way as to
mask his own selectivity in announcing them. See id. at 1949–50 (explaining that Rule 8 ―does
not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions‖).
338. Id. at 1951.
339. Id. at 1951–52.
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strain of political ideology.340 The inherent subjectivity involved in highstakes decisionmaking by the Supreme Court coupled with that Court‘s
discomfiting mandate of ad hoc adjudication in the lower courts reveals a
shift away from Marbury v. Madison‘s premise that judicial review means
saying what the law is,341 rather than what it should be, and back toward
the bygone eras of the Codes342 and Lochner.343
In rejecting the ―careful-case-management approach‖ 344 that would
allow district judges to deal with potential infringement on a high-level
official‘s governmental duties by letting a case proceed beyond the 12(b)(6)
stage but prudently overseeing discovery, Justice Kennedy stated that the
Court would not ―relax‖ the pleading requirements of Twombly and Rule 8,
in part owing to the fact that such an approach would ―provide[] especially
cold comfort in this pleading context.‖ 345 Because the discovery in
question would likely require Ashcroft and Mueller to reveal information
about post-September 11th government action better left unexposed, the
Court‘s ability to determine that Iqbal‘s complaint was deficient provided a
more blunt and predictable tool against such a consequence than an ad hoc
judicial management approach could.346 In fact, the Court‘s approach had
the effect of absolutely immunizing certain officials through the
promulgation of a pleading standard that Iqbal could only overcome by
alleging specific information regarding petitioners‘ intent, a virtual
impossibility.347 It also retreated from the Court‘s position in Leatherman
340. Id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting).
341. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (―It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.‖).
342. CLARK, supra note 65 (giving a history of the Field Codes and outlining problems
associated with them).
343. Many consider Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as symbolic of the height of
judicial activism in the Court. Some scholars offer a different view, however. See, e.g., Cass
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873–75 (1987) (calling Lochner ―the most
important of all defining cases‖ in constitutional law, but arguing that its lesson ―has yet to be
settled‖ and that the decision should actually be read to symbolize ―an approach that imposes a
constitutional requirement of neutrality, and understands the term to refer to preservation of the
existing distribution of wealth and entitlements under the baseline of the common law‖ such that it
has not, in fact, been overruled).
344. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (majority opinion).
345. Id. at 1953–54 (emphasis added).
346. Cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595–96 (1998) (noting that the D.C. Circuit had
adopted a heightened proof standard largely to decrease discovery in actions against government
officials that require proof of motive and concluding that ―the Court of Appeals‘ indirect effort to
regulate discovery employs a blunt instrument that carries a high cost, for its rule also imposes a
heightened standard of proof at trial upon plaintiffs with bona fide constitutional claims‖ (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–55 (1986))).
347. See McMahon, supra note 271, at 867 (suggesting that district judges look to Rule 8(e)
when assessing plausibility in such circumstances). Rule 8(e) provides that ―[a]ll pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
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v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit 348 that a
relaxed pleading standard subjecting government officials to costly and
time-consuming discovery would confuse freedom from liability with
immunity from suit.349
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has ―dramatically‖
expanded the scope of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 350 Iqbal has
now provided federal courts with a ―weapon‖ to continue doing so—the
dubious panacea of plausibility.351 Whether lower courts will utilize Iqbal
in this way remains to be seen.352 Ultimately, the more interesting question
is what the implications of such an open-ended, flexible pleading standard
will be not only for the difficult political cases like Iqbal, but for all civil
actions.353
Whether the Court‘s reason for implementing a plausibility standard
was to save businesses from exposure to exorbitant discovery costs by
creating a weeding-out mechanism for ―implausible‖ suits as early in the
litigation as possible,354 to prevent years of litigation in the lower courts
over the meaning of Twombly or otherwise, 355 or to continue along a
conservative line fundamentally concerned with protecting government,356

348. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
349. Id. at 166.
350. Weinstein, Role of Judges, supra note 315, at 103–04 (suggesting that the Roberts Court
has played a role in this broadening scope and arguing that the expansion is problematic because it
allows government actors to behave unjustly while still enjoying the impenetrable shield of
immunity).
351. This weapon is likely to be even more effective when coupled with other Roberts Court
tools for expanding immunity, such as through a judge-centered interpretation and application of
―reasonableness‖—a term that is, like ―plausibility,‖ inherently malleable. See, e.g., Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 393 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for ―basing its
conclusions on its own factual assumptions‖ in applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard in a seizure case that turned on whether an officer who had run a citizen off the road in a
high speed chase, rendering the latter a quadriplegic, had used unreasonable force).
352. Cf. Dodson, supra note 297, at 142 (suggesting that it will take years of increased
litigation to determine what Twombly actually means).
353. It has long been accepted that procedural law has substantive implications. For an
argument that the converse is also true—that is, that substantive law is informed by procedural
expectations—see Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 801 (2010).
354. Tony Mauro, Roberts Court Takes a Pro-Business Stance, N.Y. L.J., July 5, 2007, at 5.
355. McMahon, supra note 271, at 868 (pointing out that, ironically, although the Supreme
Court may have intended to decrease the caseload of the district courts by lowering the standard
for motions to dismiss, the new pleading standard will actually have the effect of delaying the
final disposition of many cases while judges consider a greater number of motions to dismiss than
ever before).
356. See generally Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy: The Supreme Court’s Stealth
Hard-Liner, NEW YORKER, May 29, 2009, at 44. Toobin suggests that ―[a]s a lawyer and now as
Chief Justice, Roberts has always supported legal doctrines that serve a gatekeeping function,‖
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what is clear is that Iqbal‘s impact has been significant. Only two months
after the Court announced the decision, Senator Arlen Specter introduced a
bill entitled Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009. 357 As its title
suggests, the bill seeks to restore notice pleading by preventing federal
courts from dismissing complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) ―except under the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v.
Gibson.‖358 Senator Specter‘s proposal echoes Judge Clark‘s belief that
just as history proved with the failure of the common-law and Code
pleading eras, ―people will not tolerate the denial of justice for formalities
only.‖ 359 It also responds to the possibility that the Court‘s plausibility
standard may be on shaky constitutional grounds.360
V. CONCLUSION
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court extended the plausibility
pleading standard announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 361 to all
civil actions and dismissed under that standard respondent Iqbal‘s claims
against two executive-level government supervisors asserting a qualified
such as qualified immunity. Id. at 49. He also quotes then-Senator Obama as having said of the
Chief Justice, ―It is my personal estimation that he has far more often used his formidable skills
on behalf of the strong in opposition to the weak.‖ Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
357. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (as introduced by Senate, July 22, 2009). The House of
Representatives introduced a similar bill, the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, soon after the
Senate. H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (as introduced by House, Nov. 19, 2009) (seeking to amend 28
U.S.C. § 2078 to provide, in relevant part, that a ―court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would
entitle the plaintiff to relief‖ and that a ―court shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those
subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint
do not show the plaintiff‘s claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged‖).
358. S. 1504.
359. Clark, supra note 77, at 458.
360. Cf. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1851, 1882 (2008) (arguing that Twombly and Tellabs have strayed from the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases by permitting courts to consider and weigh
―plausible inferences‖ from both parties‘ pleadings, which were questions for the jury, not the
judge, at common law). Professor Thomas argues that, consciously or not, the Court has started to
create new Seventh Amendment jurisprudence devoid of common-law analysis and therefore in
violation of constitutional limits on courts‘ and Congress‘s authority over juries. Id. at 1867–68.
The Court‘s decision in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States, 187 U.S. 315
(1902), she suggests, is the closest that the Court has come to addressing the constitutionality of a
motion to dismiss as a general matter. She asserts that Fidelity supports the constitutionality of
the Conley standard, but not the new plausibility standard. Thomas, supra, at 1871–72 & n.114;
see also McMahon, supra note 271, at 865 (―If Twombly indeed instructs district court judges to
assess at the pleading stage whether facts pleaded in a complaint give rise to a ‗believable‘ (or
‗credible‘) claim, we are inching perilously close to the line drawn by the Seventh
Amendment . . . .‖).
361. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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immunity defense. 362 Reasoning that supervisory liability in Bivens
cases363 are limited to purposeful constitutional violations by government
officials, the Court held that the facts alleged in Iqbal‘s complaint did not
support a plausible inference that petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller were
personally liable for his grievances. 364 In so holding, the Court took a
piecemeal approach to the complaint, dividing factual assertions from legal
conclusions in such a way as to highlight the degree to which a flexible
―plausibility‖ standard based on the reviewing court‘s experience and
common sense lends itself to judicial subjectivity.365 The Court therefore
endorsed and encouraged judicial discretion in the lower courts, which will
likely spawn a non-uniform, arbitrary pleading regime in which certain
defendants will no longer gain meaningful access to the courts.366 This is
because in devising and applying a procedural remedy to resolve the case,
thereby retreating from longstanding deference to the formal rulemaking
process as well as from the vision of the drafters of Rule 8, the Court
essentially raised the pleading bar in an act of judicial rule revision
unprecedented in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.367
This aggressive act, justified by an asserted need to shield government
officials from the burdens of discovery, reflects the Court‘s
unacknowledged reliance on the post-September 11th context in effectively
immunizing the two high-level officials without consideration of the merits
of qualified immunity in relation to Iqbal‘s claims. 368 The decision
therefore represents a procedural solution to a substantive dilemma.369

362.
363.
(1971).
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–51 (2009).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952–53.
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